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Thirty-five years after the United States Supreme Court held that Indian 
tribes do not have inherent sovereign power to criminally prosecute non-
Indians,1 the United States Congress “reaffirmed and recognized” the 
sovereign authority of Indian tribes to prosecute all persons committing 
certain crimes of domestic violence as part of the re-authorization of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).2 The reaffirmation of tribal 
authority contained in the VAWA reauthorization follows a similar one 
made by Congress in 1990 allowing tribes to prosecute non-member 
Indians.3 The 1990 legislation became necessary after the Court in Duro v. 
Reina similarly held that tribes do not have any authority to prosecute non-
member Indians.4 In coming to such decisions, the Court developed what is 
now known as the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine under which upon 
incorporation into the United States, Indian tribes were implicitly divested 
of any sovereign power inconsistent with their status as domestic dependent 
nations.5 After the power of Congress to pass the 1990 legislation, 
otherwise known as the Duro-Fix, was challenged in many lawsuits, in 
2004 the Supreme Court held in  United States v. Lara6 that Congress had 
the constitutional power to reaffirm such tribal power.7 The main issue in 
Lara was whether the previous decisions of the Court limiting tribal 
sovereign authority were constitutional in nature, or whether they were 
decisions of federal common law. If constitutional, Congress could not 
reaffirm tribal powers which did not constitutionally exist. On the other 
hand, if the decisions were based on federal common law, then Congress 
presumably had the power to overturn these decisions. The Court in Lara 
held that decisions, such as Oliphant and Duro, were decisions of federal 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 2. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 
54.   
 3. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012). 
 4. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).  
 5. The Court first used that term to describe Indian tribes in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 6. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 7. The Court’s decision did not resolve all potential constitutional issues surrounding 
such tribal prosecution. Thus, the Court did not decide whether tribal prosecution of non-
member Indians without the full protection of the Bill of Rights would be a violation of due 
process or equal protection. See Will Trachman, Comment, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
After U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L. REV. 
847 (2005).  
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common law. Congress could therefore recognize and affirm the tribes’ 
prosecutorial power over non-member Indians  
The reason for the ongoing debate about the constitutionality of the 
Indian section of VAWA is that while the result the Court reached in Lara 
was correct, its reasoning was deeply perplexing. The Lara Court took the 
position that in Duro, the Court simply derived the extent of tribal 
sovereignty from how the Legislative and Executive branches had treated 
Indian tribes throughout history. Thus, the Lara Court concluded that the 
Duro fix just “relaxes the restrictions, recognized in Duro, that the political 
branches had imposed on the tribes’ . . . criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians . . . .”8 The problem here is that this interpretation of the 
Court’s previous cases was as novel as it was surprising. In effect, none of 
the other implicit divestiture cases was decided pursuant to Justice Breyer’s 
reformulation of the doctrine. Nevertheless, under Lara, pursuant to 
congressional plenary power, Congress could overturn the decision and 
allow Indian tribes to once again exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians as an attribute of their inherent authority  
Now, with the enactment of the Indian provisions of VAWA, similar 
challenges are virtually certain to arise. In fact, one of the main objections 
of House Republicans during the debate surrounding the reauthorization of 
VAWA was that such congressional reaffirmation of tribal authority was 
unconstitutional.9 The time is ripe, therefore, to re-examine the Lara 
decision as well as the Court’s implicit divestiture jurisprudence.10 In this 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).  
 9. In 2012 the Republican controlled House passed a VAWA reauthorization Bill 
without the tribal jurisdiction provisions because some Republicans believed it to be 
unconstitutional.  After explaining that the House legislation did not include the 
unconstitutional provisions reaffirming tribal authority to criminally prosecute non-
Indians, the House Legislative Report stated, “It is an unsettled question of constitutional 
law whether Congress has the authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to recognize 
inherent tribal sovereignty over non-Indians.”  H.R. REP. NO. 112-480 pt. 1, at 57-60 (2012).  
In 2013, the House Republican leadership finally but reluctantly agreed to the Senate-passed 
bill containing the tribal jurisdictional provisions.  As enacted, VAWA contains severe 
restrictions on the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-members.  See infra note 
277. For instance, the defendant must reside in the Indian Country of the prosecuting tribe, 
be employed in that Country, or have a “spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner who is an 
Indian residing in such Indian Country.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012).  For a summary 
of VAWA’s Indian section, see Recent Legislation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1509 (2014).   
 10. For recent scholarship analyzing the issues that will surface following enactment of 
the Tribal jurisdiction provision contained in the VAWA Reauthorization, see Zachary S. 
Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 657 (2013) (arguing that the Court should not gauge the constitutionality of such 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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Article, I argue that because Indian tribes have been incorporated into our 
constitutional system, the federal common law analysis under which the 
Court determines the extent of sovereign authority still possessed by Indian 
tribes is faulty. Instead of using federal common law, the Court should 
adopt a constitutional mode of analysis in determining such issues.   
 Although the sovereignty of Indian tribes may not be guaranteed or 
defined in the Constitution, this does not mean that tribes have no 
constitutional status. The extent of their sovereignty should, therefore, be 
somewhat tied to a constitutional mode of analysis. The biggest threat to the 
future of Indian Nations is the Court’s refusal to integrate or incorporate 
Indian tribes under a third sphere of sovereignty within our constitutional 
system.11 Without such constitutional incorporation, the tribes exist at the 
“whim of the sovereign,” be it the United States Congress or the Supreme 
Court.12 Not only is this inconsistent with the emerging norms of 
international law on the rights of Indigenous Peoples,13 but it has also 
resulted in confusion, incoherence, and a Court determined to usurp the role 
the Constitution vested in Congress, which is to regulate the relations 
between the tribes and the United States.  
While some scholars have taken the position that Federal Indian law 
should remain sui generis, and that the major problem with the Court’s 
jurisprudence is that it is abandoning the “exceptionalism” of federal Indian 
                                                                                                                 
federal legislation based on whether it amounts to a reaffirmation or delegation of authority 
to the tribes and instead resolve the issue according to a system of divided sovereignty 
similar to how it resolves similar issues in the context of state/federal relations), and 
Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 759 (2014) (borrowing from the Court’s federalism jurisprudence 
affecting state sovereignty to argue that the Court should defer to Congress when it comes to 
determining the scope of tribal sovereignty).  For a pre-VAWA reauthorization article 
examining the issues likely to arise in legislatively re-establishing tribal inherent powers, see 
Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and 
United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of 
Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651 (2009).  
 11. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our 
Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006) [hereinafter 
Skibine, Redefining]. 
 12. I borrowed this expression from Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: 
Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980).  
 13. On the evolving norms of international law concerning the rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, see Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173 (2014).   
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common law,14 the time has come to integrate federal Indian law into 
constitutional law. From being “exceptional,” federal common law relating 
to the status of Indian tribes as sovereign governments has just become 
“exceptionally” bad. The Supreme Court is slowly, but surely, dismantling 
the idea that Indian tribes can continue to thrive as sovereigns outside our 
constitutional structure. It is time, therefore, to look elsewhere and propose 
arguments for the incorporation of Indian tribes under a third sphere of 
sovereignty within our constitutional system.15 There is no need to place 
federal Indian law in “deconstitutionalized zones,”16 or “walling off Federal 
Indian Law from mainstream constitutional discourse.”17  
This incorporation, however, carries some consequences concerning the 
proper mode of analysis the Court should use in finding limits on the 
inherent powers of Indian tribes. The correct mode of analysis the Court 
should use in limiting the powers of Indian tribes is not general common 
law, but what some have called constitutional common law.18 In this case, 
this means a dormant Indian Commerce Clause analysis. In other words, the 
Court should prevent tribes from exercising some forms of regulations over 
non-members not through the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine,19 by arbitrarily 
and subjectively deciding it is not necessary to tribal self-government, but 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999) 
[hereinafter Frickey, A Common Law]; Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism 
in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433 (2005).  
 15. For a similar argument, see Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. 
REV. 775 (2014) (arguing that because Indian tribes have been incorporated as sovereign 
entities in our Federalist system, they should benefit from federalist doctrines supporting the 
existence of multiple sovereigns).  
 16. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 25, 230 (2002); see also Kyle S. Conway, Inherently or Exclusively Federal: 
Constitutional Preemption and the Relationship Between Public Law 280 and Federalism, 
15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1323, 1326 (2013) (“Indian-law jurisprudence needs to be reconciled 
with our basic constitutional principles.”). 
 17. Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts:  Applying the Myths and the 
Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts’ Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
77, 83 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts]; see also Katherine 
Florey, Beyond Uniqueness:  Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CAL. L. REV. 
1499, 1506-07 (2013) (arguing that the Court has used the “uniqueness” of Indian tribes to 
devise special doctrines that it has then manipulated against tribal interests).   
 18. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1975).  
 19. See discussion infra Part I. 
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by reference to the power of Congress over Indian tribes. While others have 
noted some similarities between the Court’s decisions regarding the 
Implicit Divestiture Doctrine and the dormant Commerce Clause,20 no one 
has endorsed a dormant commerce clause analysis as a method to control 
tribal power. In fact, one noted scholar has vehemently opposed it.21 Yet, 
the use of a dormant Commerce Clause methodology seems especially 
appropriate here since one of the major reasons for the traditional dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine is to protect out-of-state interests that, like non-
members in a tribal context, do not participate in the state political 
process.22 As the Court once stated, legislative action affecting such out-of-
state interests “is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints 
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some 
interests within the State.”23 The dormant Indian Commerce clause test 
should be based on the underlying purpose of the Indian Commerce Clause. 
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine aims at controlling state power 
imposing restrictions on the free flow of commerce from an economic 
perspective,24 but the purpose of the Indian Commerce Clause is different. 
Its purpose is to control not only trade and intercourse between Indian tribes 
and non-Indians, but also all relations with the non-tribal world, including 
the political relations between the United States and the tribes. Therefore, 
the test should balance the federal interest in regulating trade, intercourse, 
and relations, with tribal interest in exercising authority over non-members.   
There are several advantages to adopting this mode of analysis, besides 
the fact that court decisions using that test would still be able to be 
overturned or rectified by Congress. First, the analysis does not 
unnecessarily demean tribal sovereignty by arbitrarily and progressively 
adopting continuously narrower judicial definitions of tribal self-
government using unprincipled federal common law. Second, because the 
analysis prevents tribal jurisdiction by focusing on congressional authority, 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal 
Courts over Non-Member Indians, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 70, 74 (1991) (“As in the 
dormant commerce clause cases, the Court is influenced by its impression of congressional 
expectations, which expectations, if incorrect, can be clarified.”).  
 21. See Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 14, at 68–73.  “[T]hat approach would be a 
particularly inapt one to embrace in Indian law.” Id. at 68–69.   
 22. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 23. S.C. Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 196 n.2 (1938). 
 24. On the purpose of the Commerce Clause, see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union 
as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988).  On the economic purpose of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001).  
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the power of Congress over Indian tribes should first be redefined and 
limited to be within constitutional bounds. Finally, using a dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause analysis would resolve the confusion generated by the 
Supreme Court’s current implicit divestiture jurisprudence.25 
Part I, after describing the holding and rationale of Lara, explains the 
evolution of the implicit divestiture doctrine and shows why Lara’s 
formulation of the doctrine has further exacerbated the confusion 
surrounding the doctrine. This Part, however, also argues that Justice 
Breyer’s reformulation of the implicit divestiture doctrine in Lara was in 
fact sound and is, in many ways, consistent with the proposed dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause analysis. Part II sets forth the case for the 
incorporation of Indian tribes as sovereign entities within our constitutional 
system. Finally, Part III explains the consequences of incorporation for the 
Court, the Congress, and the Indian nations. It ends by discussing whether 
the incorporation of Indian tribes into the constitutional order also means 
that some constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, should 
be applicable to tribal adjudicatory proceedings. 
I. The Evolution of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine 
A. United States v. Lara26 
The issue in Lara was whether the United States could proceed with the 
federal prosecution of Billy Jo Lara, an enrolled member of the Turtle 
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, after the Spirit Lake Indian Tribe had 
already prosecuted him for the same crime. Lara argued that because the 
United States could not “reaffirm” the inherent power of the tribe to 
prosecute him after Duro, which held such tribal power was lost upon tribal 
incorporation into the United States, the tribal prosecution in Lara was 
conducted pursuant to a delegation of federal authority to the tribe. 
Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution 
prevented a subsequent federal prosecution. The Court disagreed, and held 
that Congress could reaffirm such tribal power. In its 7–2 ruling, the Court 
stated, “Congress does possess the constitutional power to lift the 
restrictions on the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.”27 
According to the Court, the legislation reaffirming such tribal power - 
                                                                                                                 
 25.  On such confusion, see Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal 
Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of 
Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009).  
 26. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
 27. Id. at 200. 
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known as the Duro-Fix - just “relaxes the restrictions, recognized in Duro, 
that the political branches had imposed on the tribes’ exercise of inherent 
prosecutorial power.”28 The Court found that Oliphant and Duro 
reflect the Court’s view of the tribes’ retained sovereign status as 
of the time the Court made them.  They did not set forth 
constitutional limits that prohibit Congress from changing the 
relevant circumstances, i.e. from taking actions that modify or 
adjust the tribes’ status.  To the contrary, Oliphant and Duro 
make clear that the Constitution does not dictate the metes and 
bounds of tribal autonomy.29  
In large part, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Lara relied on the 
plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs. Thus, he stated, “The 
Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to 
Indians tribes, powers that that we have consistently described as ‘plenary 
and exclusive.’”30 Furthermore, Justice Breyer found nothing in the 
Constitution “suggesting a limitation on Congress’ institutional authority to 
relax restrictions on tribal sovereignty.”31 In the process of reaching its 
result, the Court made two related findings. First, it held that the extent of 
tribal sovereignty is not a constitutional question.32 Second, the Court based 
its holding on the notion that because Congress has plenary power over 
Indian tribes, it can re-calibrate the metes and bounds of tribal 
sovereignty.33 Implicit in these two findings is a third: the reason that the 
extent of tribal sovereignty is not a constitutional question is that Congress 
has plenary power to increase (perhaps within limits) or reduce (apparently 
without limits) the extent of tribal sovereignty.   
Although Lara was officially a 7–2 decision, Justice Kennedy only 
concurred in the result because he believed that any challenge to 
congressional power reaffirming tribal power to prosecute non-member 
Indians should have been raised during the tribal prosecution, and not the 
subsequent federal one. In addition, the Lara majority opinion generated an 
interesting concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. While agreeing that the 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 205.  
 30. Id. at 200.  
 31. Id. at 204.  
 32. Id. at 205 (stating that “the Constitution does not dictate the metes and bounds of 
tribal autonomy”). 
 33. Id. at 202 (stating that Congress has enacted many statutes which “inevitably 
involve major changes in the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty”).  
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Tribes did not have constitutional status as sovereigns,34 Thomas opined 
that it was inconsistent for the Court to take the position that the tribes are 
sovereign in any meaningful sense, while at the same time concluding that 
Congress has plenary authority over them. Thus, after stating, “I cannot 
agree with the Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to Congress 
plenary power to calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty,’”35 
he asserted that it “is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not to exist 
merely at the whim of an external government.”36 Because Justice Thomas 
seriously questioned whether the Court could hold that Congress had 
plenary authority over Indian tribes-while at the same time taking the 
position that Indian tribes were still sovereign in any meaningful sense-his 
concurrence raises substantial doubts that he would rubber stamp a 
congressional recognition of tribal sovereignty to prosecute non-Indians as 
was done in VAWA. Lara then looks more like a 5–4 decision. 
Furthermore, three members of Lara’s majority of five no longer sit on the 
Court, which casts serious doubts on the strength of the case as precedent 
for upholding the constitutionality of the new Indian section of VAWA. 
Moreover, as set forth below, the evolution of the Implicit Divestiture 
Doctrine is inconsistent with some of Justice Breyer’s assertions in Lara.   
B. Justice Rehnquist’s Oliphant Opinion   
The issue in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe was whether the tribe 
could prosecute a non-Indian who had punched the tribal police chief while 
on the tribe’s reservation.37 The Court, through Justice Rehnquist, held that 
the tribe did not have such criminal jurisdiction. At the time, the widely 
accepted paradigm defining the powers of Indian tribes was laid out in Felix 
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, first published in 1942.38  
There, he wrote: 
The whole course of judicial decisions on the nature of Indian 
tribal powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental 
principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses . . . all the powers of 
any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the 
legislative power of the United States and, in substance, 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 219 (“The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order, and their 
sovereignty is not guaranteed by it.”). 
 35. Id. at 215. 
 36. Id. at 218.  
 37. 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 38. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Univ. of N.M. photo. 
reprint 1971) (1942) [hereinafter COHEN].  
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terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe . . . but 
does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e. 
its powers of local self-government.  (3) These powers are 
subject to quantification by treaties and by express legislation of 
Congress.39 
Instead of following Cohen’s principles, Justice Rehnquist first engaged in 
a lengthy historical analysis showing that the three branches of the United 
States government shared an assumption that Indian tribes did not possess 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Thus, the Court concluded “while 
Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties 
on non-Indians, we now make express our implied conclusion of nearly a 
century ago that Congress consistently believed this to be the necessary 
result of its repeated legislative actions.”40  However, the Court did not rest 
its holding solely on this congressional belief. The Court also stated that 
Indian tribes are “prohibited from exercising both those powers of 
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those 
powers inconsistent with their status.”41 Attempting to further delineate 
what kind of powers were inconsistent with tribal status, the Court stated, 
“Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes 
thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and their 
exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the 
interests of this overriding sovereignty.”42 Tribal criminal prosecutorial 
powers were in conflict with the overriding sovereign interests of the 
United States because, since the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to tribal 
prosecution, “unwarranted intrusions” on the personal liberty of non-
Indians could result.43  
Oliphant seems like a mix of federal common law arguments loosely 
based on congressional treatment of tribes upon which the Court added a 
patina of constitutionally derived policies.  Justice Rehnquist first relied 
upon the “shared assumptions” of the three branches concerning tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians and the historical treatment of tribal 
jurisdiction by Congress and the Executive. Then he abruptly declared that, 
even ignoring this treatment and history, upon incorporation into the United 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 132 (internal citations omitted).  
 40. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.  
 41. Id. at 208. 
 42. Id. at 209. 
 43. Id. at 210.  In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896), the Court had held that 
Indian tribes were not bound by the federal Bill of Rights when exercising their inherent 
governmental authority.  
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States, Indian tribes lost the ability to exercise inherent powers in conflict 
with the overriding sovereign interests of the United States. Furthermore, 
the Court based its conclusion that the exercise of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians conflicts with the overriding sovereign 
interests of the United States on the fact that tribal prosecution could 
amount to an unwarranted intrusion on the personal liberty of non-Indian 
citizens since tribes are not bound by the Constitution. In effect, Justice 
Rehnquist modified Cohen’s second fundamental principle to read that 
“[c]onquest . . . terminates the external powers or sovereignty of tribes and 
also those internal sovereign powers when the exercise of these powers 
conflict with an overriding sovereign interest of the United States as 
determined by the Court.” This analysis can be reconciled with and is not 
that different from what the analysis would have looked like had it rested 
on the dormant Commerce Clause.44 
C. Justice Stewart’s Modification 
A few weeks after Oliphant, the Court issued its decision in United 
States v. Wheeler.45 At stake was whether the federal government could 
prosecute a Navajo tribal member for statutory rape when a tribal court had 
already convicted him of contributing to the delinquency of a minor under a 
charge arising out of the same set of facts or whether the double jeopardy 
clause of the United States Constitution barred the subsequent federal 
prosecution. The answer depended on whether the tribe had prosecuted 
Wheeler pursuant to delegated federal authority or pursuant to its own 
inherent sovereign power. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart 
held that the tribe had prosecuted Wheeler pursuant to its own inherent 
sovereign power. Although the result in Wheeler supports tribal 
sovereignty, Justice Stewart was no pro-tribal advocate.46 In dictum in Part 
II.B of the decision, he expounded generally on the limits of inherent tribal 
sovereignty. After stating that “[t]he areas in which such implicit divestiture 
of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving relations 
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe,”47 he concluded that 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See discussion infra notes 175-89 . 
 45. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).  
 46. For instance, he was one of the few dissenters a year later in Washington v. 
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), the 
landmark case which upheld the treaty fishing rights of the tribes in the state of Washington.   
 47. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326. 
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These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of 
Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily 
inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their 
external relations.  But the powers of self-government, including 
the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of 
a different type.  They involve only the relations among 
members of a tribe.  Thus, they are not such powers as would 
necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.48 
Justice Stewart failed to cite any precedent for this narrow definition of 
powers of self-government. As it turned out though, this paragraph would 
become the foundation of the Court’s new common law concerning the 
inherent powers of Indian tribes in United States v. Montana,49 not 
surprisingly another of Stewart’s opinions. This is the decision which 
transformed the Oliphant doctrine from one based on Federal assumptions 
about inherent tribal powers, and whether a tribal power was inconsistent 
with overriding federal sovereign interests to one based on nothing but the 
Court’s own political views on whether non-members should be subjected 
to tribal jurisdiction.  
The main issue in Montana was whether the tribe had the authority to 
regulate hunting and fishing by non-members of the tribe on land 
determined by the Court to be non-Indian fee land located within the Crow 
Indian reservation. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart started his 
analysis by quoting this same passage from his Wheeler opinion, and 
quickly announced his new principle that the “exercise of tribal power 
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.”50 
Having stated this principle, Justice Stewart modified the Oliphant doctrine 
as follows: “Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in 
criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general 
proposition that the inherent powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”51 Having stated the rule, the Court 
immediately recognized two exceptions. The first exception allows tribes 
“to regulate through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of 
non-members who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 50. Id. at 564.  
 51. Id. at 565 (emphasis added). 
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arrangements.”52 The second exception, known as the tribal self-
government exception, allows tribal civil authority over the conduct of non-
members (even on fee lands within the reservation) “when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.”53  
Although at first it seemed that these two exceptions to the general rule 
would allow certain tribal authority over non-members, this has not proved 
true.54 Even though the Court early on recognized some tribal jurisdiction 
over non-members in some, albeit narrow, circumstances,55 the Court since 
1989 has never upheld any tribal authority over non-members, and has 
issued a string of opinions severely restricting the scope of both exceptions. 
Furthermore, absent from the Montana approach is any reference to the 
actual understanding and assumptions of Congress concerning tribal 
authority or the historical treatment of tribal civil jurisdiction by the 
political branches of the government. Also missing are any references to 
whether the assumption of tribal civil authority could be in conflict with 
any overriding sovereign federal interests. In other words, the Montana case 
based its general rule on a completely subjective and arbitrary definition of 
what amounts to external relations, and followed up with some exceptions 
focusing on either the existence of consensual relations or a subjective 
analysis of what is necessary for tribal self-government. It is an analysis 
divorced from any constitutional or statutory moorings.56  
D. Duro v. Reina: Justice Kennedy’s Quasi-Constitutional Approach 
Duro v. Reina asked whether the Oliphant rationale applied to the tribal 
prosecution of an Indian that was not a member of the prosecuting tribe (in 
other words, a non-member Indian).57 Oliphant only spoke in terms of 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. For contrasting views on the application of the two exceptions, see Sarah Krakoff, 
Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Non-Members: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1187 (2010), and Neil G. Westesen & Crowley Fleck, From Montana to Plains 
Commerce Bank and Beyond: The Supreme Court’s View of Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-
Members (Mar. 4, 2011) (paper no. 9 presented at the Special Institute on Natural Resources 
Development on Indian Lands, Rocky Mountain Mineral Foundation).   
 55. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
 56. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier:  The New Subjectivism of 
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, 
Conquering]. 
 57. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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Indians and non-Indians, and relied on the historical treatment of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians as well as the assumptions of Congress and 
the Executive that Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy concluded that even 
though the historical record in this case was not as clear as it was with tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians,58 Oliphant’s rationale applied to non-member 
Indians, because they were also United States citizens.59 Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion relied on the analysis used in Wheeler for the proposition that 
prosecuting non-member Indians was an exercise of external relations60 and 
on Oliphant to argue tribal criminal prosecution constituted an unwarranted 
intrusion on the personal liberty of non-member Indians.61 However, what 
stands out is Justice Kennedy’s willingness to enunciate the policy 
rationales for restricting tribal jurisdiction over non-members. Thus, after 
“hesitat[ing] to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out 
another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies 
that do not include them,”62 Justice Kennedy expressed concern that tribal 
courts were “influenced by unique customs . . . unspoken practices and 
norms,” and are often “subordinated to the political branches of the tribal 
governments.”63 In addition, since the Bill of Rights is not applicable to 
Indian tribes, Kennedy argued that “[t]his is all the more reason to reject an 
extension of tribal authority over those who have not given the consent of 
the governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our 
constitutional system.”64   
While Duro’s reliance on both Oliphant and Wheeler may qualify the 
decision as another federal common law decision, parts of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion indicate a potential constitutional basis for his 
decision.65 Thus, Kennedy concluded, “The retained sovereignty of the tribe 
is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 688 (“The historical record in this case is somewhat less illuminating than in 
Oliphant . . . .”).  
 59. Id. at 692 (“Whatever might be said of the historical record, we must view it in light 
of petitioner’s status as a citizen of the United States.”). 
 60. Id. at 686. 
 61. Id. at 692.  
 62. Id. at 693. 
 63. Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 38, at 334-35). 
 64. Id. at 694. 
 65. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It: A 
Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 782-84 (1993) 
[hereinafter Skibine, Power Play]. 
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Indians who consent to be tribal members.”66 Professor Bruce Duthu notes 
that the constitutional underpinnings of Justice Kennedy’s Duro opinion 
became clearer in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lara, where he 
stated:  
Lara, after all, is a citizen of the United States.  To hold that 
Congress can subject him, within our domestic borders, to a 
sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a 
serious step.  The Constitution is based on a theory of original, 
and continuing, consent of the governed.  Their consent depends 
on the understanding that the Constitution has established the 
federal structure which grants the citizen the protection of two 
governments, the Nation and the State . . . . Here, contrary to this 
design, the National Government seeks to subject a citizen to the 
criminal jurisdiction of a third entity.67  
Duthu, who described Kennedy’s constitutional interpretive approach as 
“structuralist,” concluded that,  
For Kennedy, the structural guarantees of personal and political 
liberty are as fully enforceable against the federal government as 
the textually based freedoms embodied in the Bill of Rights.  
Therefore, even if Congress were inclined to affirm a broader 
scope of inherent tribal sovereignty to include authority over 
non-members, Kennedy locates constraints on that federal power 
emanating from the constitutional structure.68   
In other words, there are constitutional reasons why Congress cannot allow 
Indian tribes operating outside the structure of the Constitution to have 
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians who are citizens of the 
United States.69   
The bottom line is that, contrary to Justice Breyer’s assertion in Lara, 
Justice Kennedy’s Duro analysis relies only marginally on the policies of 
the political branches of the government. Kennedy’s main argument is that  
as citizens of the United States, the non-tribal members have not consented 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. 
 67. N. BRUCE DUTHU, SHADOW NATIONS 153 (2013) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 
U.S. 193, 212 (2004)). 
 68. Id. at 155–56. 
 69. See Tweedy, supra note 10, at 700 (stating that because of Kennedy’s Lara opinion, 
“any restoration statute should, to the extent possible, provide for protection of individual 
constitutional rights”). 
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to be governed by tribal entities outside the structure of the Constitution.70 
This argument seems to be anchored in the Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”71 
The Declaration, of course, is only aspirational. It neither binds the Court, 
nor is part of constitutional text.  
E. Nevada v. Hicks: Justice Scalia’s Balancing Approach 
In Nevada v. Hicks,72 a tribal member sued state game wardens in tribal 
court arguing that, when these state officials searched his house while 
investigating whether he violated the state gaming laws while hunting 
outside the reservation, they damaged some of his property and violated his 
civil rights. The major issue in the case was whether the Montana rule 
applied even though the conduct of the state officials occurred on Indian-
owned land within the reservation. While the Court was unanimous that 
Montana was applicable, the Justices disagreed on the relative weight given 
to the fact that the incident occurred on Indian-owned land. Writing for a 
plurality of four, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the status of the land 
played a central role in previous cases, but asserted that Indian ownership 
of the land could not suspend the “‘general proposition’ derived from 
Oliphant that ‘the inherent powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers . . .’ except to the extent ‘necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’”73 Instead, according 
to Justice Scalia, land ownership was just one factor in determining whether 
tribal jurisdiction was necessary to tribal self-government. Justice Scalia 
broke new ground, however, when, after stating that “[s]tate sovereignty 
does not end at a reservation’s border,”74 he asserted that evaluating the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. This point was not lost on Justice Brennan in his Duro dissent when he stated, 
“[T]he Court concludes that regardless of whether tribes were assumed to retain power over 
nonmembers as a historical matter, the tribes were implicitly divested of this power in 1924 
when Indians became full citizens.” Duro, 495 U.S. at 706. 
 71. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
 72. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 73. Id. at 359 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981)).  
 74. Id. at 361.  
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tribal right of self-government requires “an accommodation between the 
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and 
those of the State, on the other.”75 In other words, Justice Scalia imported 
into the Montana analysis the test usually performed in determining 
whether a state has jurisdiction over non-members on Indian reservations. 
Derived from the Indian Preemption Doctrine, this test consists of 
determining whether state jurisdiction is preempted on an Indian 
reservation by the operation of federal law. This is a balancing test of sorts, 
because it balances the interest of the federal and tribal governments against 
the state interests.   
This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute 
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine 
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority 
would violate federal law.76 
Since Justice Scalia wrote for a plurality, it is hard to determine the 
precedential value of his opinion. Justice Souter’s opinion, joined by 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, stated that the status of the land was not a 
“primary jurisdictional fact.”77 Furthermore, Justice Souter would have 
applied the two Montana exceptions without balancing the interests of the 
tribe with those of the states. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Stevens 
and Breyer, took the opposite position. She believed that the status of the 
land should always be a prominent factor when applying the two Montana 
exceptions.78 Perhaps Hicks and the balancing methodology should be 
limited to instances where the tribe attempts to assert jurisdiction over state 
officials.79  Some courts limit Hicks in this way,80 but others have not.81 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 362 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 156 (1980)). 
 76. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).  
 77. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375-76. 
 78. Id. at 395-96 (Justice O’Connor, concurring and dissenting). 
 79. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense out of Nevada v. Hicks: A 
Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347 (2001) [hereinafter Skibine, Making Sense]. 
 80. See McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002).  “Even if Hicks could be 
interpreted as suggesting that the Montana rule is more generally applicable than either 
Montana or Strate have allowed, Hicks makes no claim that it modifies or overrules 
Montana.”  Id. at 540 n.9; see also South Dakota v. Cummings, 679 N.W. 2d 484 (S.D. 
2004) (distinguishing the case at hand on the ground that it involved state officials trying to 
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Hicks may not even apply when the tribe has retained the power to 
exclude,82 as the Ninth Circuit recently found.83  
F. Chief Justice Roberts’ Approach: Merging the Two Montana 
Exceptions? 
The latest case applying the Montana analysis at the Supreme Court was 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch.84 The issue was whether the 
tribal court had jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by tribal members 
against a non-Indian bank alleging that the bank discriminated against the 
tribal members by offering land within the reservation for sale at terms 
more favorable to non-Indians than to the tribal members.85 The tribal court 
asserted jurisdiction over the dispute, and ruled in favor of the tribal 
members. In addition to awarding damages, it ordered the bank to sell the 
land, which the bank owned in fee simple, to the tribal plaintiffs. The 
Supreme Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs’ discrimination claim because “the Tribe lacks the civil authority 
to regulate the Bank’s sale of its fee land.”86 After stating that “Montana 
and its progeny permit tribal regulation of non-member conduct inside the 
reservation that implicates the tribe’s sovereign interests,”87 Justice Roberts 
held that the sale of land was not “conduct” for the purposes of allowing 
tribal regulations under Montana’s consensual relation exception. The 
Court also declared, without citing any authority, that “[t]he distinction 
between sale of the land and conduct on it is well established . . . and 
entirely logical given the . . . liberty interest of nonmembers.”88  
In focusing on the sale of land as not being “conduct” for the purpose of 
Montana’s first exception, the court ignored that the “conduct” at issue was 
                                                                                                                 
prosecute a tribal member in state courts while Hicks involved a tribal member trying to sue 
state officials in tribal court).   
 81. See MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 82. See Skibine, Making Sense, supra note 79, at 356–59. 
 83. See Water Wheel v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011).  But see Rolling Frito 
Lay-Sales v. Stover, No. CV 11–1361–PHX–FJM, 2012 WL 252938 (D. Ariz. Jan. 26, 
2012) (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit even though the district court is located within that 
circuit). 
 84. 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
 85. For a more extensive discussion of this case, see Frank Pommersheim, Amicus 
Briefs in Indian Law: The Case of Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle 
Co., 56 S. DAK. L. REV. 86 (2011).  
 86. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 330.  
 87. Id. at 332.  
 88. Id. at 334.  
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not simply the sale of land. It was, instead, the “discrimination” that 
occurred in selling the land. Following the Court’s position to its logical, 
but normatively very unattractive, conclusion, a tribe could never forbid a 
non-member merchant selling anything on reservation fee land from 
engaging in discriminatory practices against tribal Indians. As pointed out 
by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, if the majority believed that the tribal court 
was without power to order the sale of the land as a remedy, it should have 
disallowed this particular remedy while still allowing the tribal court to 
award damages for discrimination.89  
One of the major issues generated by the Plains Commerce Bank 
majority is the statement made in connection with discussing Montana’s 
consensual relation exception. “The logic of Montana is that certain 
activities on non-Indian fee land . . . or certain uses . . . may intrude on the 
internal relations of the tribe or threaten tribal self-rule. To the extent they 
do, such activities or land uses may be regulated.”90 Similarly, in 
responding to Justice Ginsburg’s concurring and dissenting opinion, which 
questioned how tribal regulation of land sales could be distinguished from 
previous judicially condoned tribal regulations, the Court stated “regulation 
of the sale of non-Indian fee land, unlike the above, cannot be justified by 
reference to the tribe’s sovereign interests. By definition, fee land owned by 
nonmembers has already been removed from the tribe’s immediate 
control.”91 These statements could be construed as an effort to merge the 
two Montana exceptions. This became even clearer later in the opinion 
when the Court added that tribal “laws and regulations may be fairly 
imposed on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented, either 
expressly or by his actions. Even then, the regulation must stem from the 
tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry, preserve 
tribal self-government, or control internal relations.”92 A non-Indian 
corporation utilized this argument in a later case to challenge the 
jurisdiction of a tribal court.93 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rightly 
refused to go along, stating, “We do not interpret Plains Commerce to 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 342–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The damages awarded by the tribal court in 
the case were about $750,000.  
 90. Id. at 334–35.  
 91. Id. at 335-36. 
 92. Id. at 337. 
 93. See Dolgencorp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 
2014).  
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require an additional showing that one specific relationship, in itself, 
‘intrude[s] on the internal relations of the tribe or threaten[s] self-rule.’”94  
Analysis of the various theories adopted in these cases reveals that at the 
Supreme Court, confusion reigns supreme when interpreting and applying 
the implicit divestiture doctrine. The doctrine was first invoked by Justice 
Rehnquist in Oliphant, severely modified by Justice Stewart in Wheeler and 
Montana, quasi-constitutionalized by Justice Kennedy in Duro, re-
interpreted by Justice Scalia in Hicks, before being re-conceptualized by 
Justice Breyer in Lara. Finally, Justice Roberts in Plains Commercial Bank 
seems to condone discrimination against tribal members, by arguing that 
discrimination in the sale of real estate is not conduct that the tribe may 
regulate. 
G. The Problem with Federal Common Law 
Although the federal courts’ use of federal common law raises issues of 
both separation of power and federalism, the overwhelming weight of the 
debate among scholars has focused on federalism and the power of federal 
courts to displace state law.95 When it comes to separation of power 
concerns, meaning the use of federal common law by the courts to unduly 
trample on the role of Congress to make laws, it seems that there are few (if 
any) limits if the area is one where the courts can make rules based on 
common law.96 As Professor Louise Weinberg stated, “I take it that there 
are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal rules of 
decision.”97 Although this position is not universally shared,98 it seems to be 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 175. The Fifth Circuit also stated that it agreed with the district court that 
under Montana “the ability to regulate the working conditions (particularly as pertains to 
health and safety) of tribe members employed on reservation land is plainly central to the 
tribe’s power of self-government.” Id.  It has to be noted, however, that the case involved 
especially bad facts for the non-Indian corporation. The case involved an Indian child who 
alleged that he had been sexually abused by the non-Indian employee of a non-Indian 
corporation while being an intern at a store owned by the corporation and located on Indian 
land. 
 95. See generally Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
895 (1996). 
 96. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 947 (1986) (arguing that out of concern for judicial legitimacy and 
deference to Congress, courts should nevertheless point to some kind of authority for the 
making of federal common law, whether it be a treaty, a statute, or the Constitution) 
 97. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989).  
 98.  Another noted scholar once stated, “[T]here can be no such thing as ‘federal 
common law,’ at least to the extent it is used to provide a ‘rule of decision’ and to the extent 
the phrase ‘common law’ is construed as a category of lawmaking distinct from 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/2
No. 1] THE INHERENT POWERS OF INDIAN TRIBES 97 
 
 
the majority view, which is unfortunate. The fashioning of rules of decision 
should be, however loosely, tied either to congressional policies as reflected 
in federal statutes, or to values emanating from the constitutional text.99  As 
the Court previously noted, 
The legislative establishment of policy carries significance 
beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved. The 
policy thus established has become itself a part of our law, to be 
given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory 
construction but also in those of decisional law. . . . 
 . . . 
 This appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in 
the development of the law reflects the practices of common-law 
courts from the most ancient times. As Professor Landis has 
said, “much of what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ 
finds its source in legislative enactment.”100   
Yet, as many scholars have observed, the Court’s decisions in federal 
Indian law are completely divorced from both  current congressional 
policies and the history of those policies for the last fifty or so years.101 
Instead, when it comes to federal Indian common law, the Court seems to 
think that there are no constraints because it has given Congress plenary 
power over Indian Nations. Scholars have noted that in Federal Indian law, 
the Court has failed to address where its authority to make common law 
comes from because the existence of such authority is so well 
established.102 The problem, of course, is that the Court seems to think that 
if Congress can potentially act without limits in Indian Affairs, so can the 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional or statutory ‘interpretation.’” Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, 
Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. 
U. L. REV. 761, 792 (1989).   
 99. See, e.g., Bradford R Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996) (arguing that courts should only be able to make rules of 
federal common law if they are directly implied from the constitutional structure or if they 
are necessary to further a basic structure of the constitutional scheme); see also Jay 
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 
(2006). 
 100. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-91, 392 (1970) (quoting James 
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213-14 (Roscoe Pound 
ed., 1934)).  
 101. See, e.g., Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 14.   
 102. See Field, supra note 96, at 948–49.   
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Court. As a result, any debate concerning what kind of inherent sovereign 
powers the tribes possess becomes wide open. The Court may be influenced 
by its current subjective notion of what Indian tribes are or have become.103 
Perhaps some Justices think the tribes should only be cultural organizations, 
while others may conceptualize them as uniquely business enterprises or 
casino owners.  Just about anything goes. The Court is free to develop its 
own “Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism.”104  
 At the time Congress enacted the Duro Fix, as well as when the Court 
issued its Lara decision, pro-tribal scholars and advocates were all in favor 
of describing these cases as federal common law decisions, because this 
meant the decisions could be overturned by Congress.105 Yet these scholars 
also severely criticized these past decisions, even stating such decisions 
were incoherent and unprincipled.106 Others have acknowledged the 
dilemma.  
I think a number of us writing and talking say: well, those are 
federal common law decisions. . . . 
 But now, I’m not so sure that we should actually say that they 
are federal common law decisions, because I would argue it 
gives them a legitimacy that they’re not entitled to. Because if 
you say they’re federal common law decisions you’re saying 
basically they’re okay. And I would argue in a constitutional 
sense those decisions are essentially improper.107 
Professor Pommersheim later expounded on the issue, stating:  
The Court has developed a most robust activist posture to deal 
with nettlesome challenges of modern Indian law. It is an 
approach almost completely shorn of any concern for 
constitutional and historical doctrine, the role of a limited 
judiciary, and respect for those who were here first. . . . 
 . . . 
 . . . In a sense, the Court has become the ultimate organ for 
formulating Indian policy in contemporary Indian law. This 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Getches, Conquering, supra note 56. 
 104. See Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 14.   
 105. See, for instance, Deloria & Newton, supra note 20.  
 106. See Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 14.  
 107. Frank Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in Indian 
Law, 80 N.D. L. REV. 743, 751 (2004).   
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raises a quintessential separation of powers issue, with the Court 
usurping the constitutional role of Congress to make law and 
formulate policy.108  
Some have argued that the use of federal common law by the Court to 
limit the sovereignty of Indian tribes “appear[s] to be nothing more than 
lawmaking by fiat, despite their grounding in federal common law.”109 
However, if the Court bases its determinations about tribal jurisdiction not 
on general common law, but on constitutional common law (such as the 
dormant Indian Commerce Clause), the constraints should be much 
narrower. Thus, the Court should have to explain why tribal jurisdiction in a 
given area is in conflict with federal interests reflected either in the 
Constitution or in congressional statutes.  
II. Towards a Constitutional Mode of Analysis 
A constitutional mode of analysis is required because even though tribal 
sovereignty is not guaranteed by the Constitution, tribes still have a 
constitutional status in that their sovereignty is acknowledged in the 
Constitution. The normative reason for using a version of the dormant 
Commerce Clause as a constitutionally based common law mode of 
analysis to limit tribal powers is that Indian tribes have been incorporated as 
third sovereigns within our constitutional order.  
A. The Original Quasi-Constitutional Status of Indian Tribes 
In a recent oral argument before the United States Supreme Court the 
following exchange took place between Justice Scalia and the lawyer 
arguing for the United States: 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: Who made these Indian tribes sovereign?  
Was it Congress? 
 MR. KNEEDLER: The Constitution. 
 . . . 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: Who pronounced them to be sovereign? 
                                                                                                                 
 108. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 229 (2009) [hereinafter POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE].   
 109. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 96 (2012) 
[hereinafter Fletcher, Tribal Consent]. 
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 MR. KNEEDLER: This -- this Court.110 
Both answers are correct, although the sovereignty of Indian tribes was 
first acknowledged and recognized by the United States neither by the 
Constitution nor by the Court. It was probably first recognized when the 
United States Senate ratified the first treaty with an Indian Nation.111 The 
Court “pronounced” the tribes sovereign as early as 1831, and the 
Constitution did, implicitly at least, “decide” that the tribes were sovereign.   
In an influential article, Professor Philip Frickey once expressed the view 
that if Johnson v. M’Intosh112 was a concession to colonialism, Chief 
Justice Marshall’s two Cherokee decisions, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia113 
and Worcester v. Georgia,114 were an attempt “to mediate the tension 
between colonialism and constitutionalism.”115 According to Professor 
Frickey, although the Constitution did not guarantee tribal sovereignty, 
Justice Marshall considered the treaties made with Indian tribes to be quasi-
constitutional documents, and the interpretive methodology he used was 
very similar to the one the Court has used to protect state sovereignty and 
federalism.  Professor Frickey further argued that in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall tied the sovereignty of Indian tribes 
directly to the Constitution by quoting the entire Commerce Clause “not 
merely to demonstrate that tribes are different from ‘foreign nations,’ but 
also to confirm the sovereign status of tribes.”116 In Article I, the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate “Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”117 Thus, 
Marshall stated, “We perceive plainly that the constitution in this article 
does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term ‘foreign nations;’ not 
we presume because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not 
foreign to the United States.”118 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55-56, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. 
Ct. 2024 (2014) (No. 12-515). 
 111. The first official treaty was the Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 
13.  
 112. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 113. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 114. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  STOPPED HERE 
 115. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, 
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 385 (1993) [hereinafter 
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present]. 
 116. Id. at 392.   
 117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 118. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19. 
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If Cherokee Nation laid the foundation, Worcester confirmed Justice 
Marshall’s understanding that tribal sovereignty is constitutionally based. 
There, Marshall wrote 
The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means ‘a 
people distinct from others.’  The constitution, by declaring 
treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the 
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the 
previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently 
admits their rank among those powers who are capable of 
making treaties.119   
 In Worcester, Georgia argued it could impose its laws over the 
Cherokees because the Cherokee Nation had relinquished its right to self-
government in the treaties it signed with the United States. Accordingly, the 
Cherokee Nation should no longer be described as an Indian tribe in the 
constitutional sense, and therefore the Commerce clause could no longer be 
used to preempt state jurisdiction. The Court disagreed; it held that the 
Cherokee Nation had not relinquished its power of self-government in the 
treaties. The Constitution’s exclusive grant to regulate Indian affairs to 
Congress, therefore, still applied and Georgia was preempted.120 Implicit in 
this holding was that in order to qualify as an Indian tribe under the 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, a tribe has to be a self-governing entity 
possessing a certain amount of inherent sovereignty. 
Although other scholars have argued that Indian Nations have a 
constitutional status,121 the extent of tribal sovereignty is not guaranteed and 
protected in the Constitution.122 As stated in Justice Thomas’s Lara 
concurrence: “The Tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional 
order, and their sovereignty is not guaranteed by it.”123  What the drafters of 
the Constitution thought about the future of Indian tribes as sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559. 
 120. For a convincing argument that Worcester v. Georgia was a classic use of the 
dormant commerce clause doctrine to preempt state jurisdiction, see generally Robert N. 
Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995). 
 121. E.g., Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional 
Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318 (2003).  
 122. This is why some scholars, such as Frank Pommersheim, have made a cogent 
argument for the need of a constitutional amendment.  See POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN 
LANDSCAPE, supra note 108. 
 123. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 53, 60–68 
(2006). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
102 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
 
nations is debatable.124 It is true that the Constitution does not define the 
sovereignty of Indian Nations any more that it defines the sovereignty of 
foreign nations.  This does not mean, however, that the Constitution does 
not at least acknowledge the sovereign status of tribal governments.125 
Instead, the most likely explanation is that, “[t]aken together, the three 
explicit constitutional references to Indians and the Treaty Clause embody a 
view that tribes are sovereign, and permanently so, but that their 
sovereignty operates largely outside of the constitutional framework.”126  
B. The Progressive Incorporation of Indian Tribes into the Constitutional 
Order 
Although Indian tribes started outside of the United States, they were 
incorporated into the physical territory of the United States under the 
Doctrine of Discovery.127 Their tribal members were incorporated within 
the political system of the United States under the Indian Citizenship Act of 
1924.128  Indian tribes, as political sovereigns, eventually also became 
incorporated (albeit without their full consent) into the United States 
constitutional system.129   
1. Court Decisions Reflecting Incorporation  
There is no question that Indian nations started outside the political 
system of the United States even though the geographic limits of the United 
States fully surround their territories.130 Thus, in Worcester v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court stated that Indian nations had “territorial boundaries, within 
which their authority is exclusive.”131 Furthermore, the Court held that the 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014) 
[hereinafter Ablavsky, Savage Constitution] (showing that many states voted for the 
ratification of the Constitution with the understanding that a strong central federal 
government would help them fight the Indian tribes militarily or would at least persuade the 
Indian tribes to move west, thus removing themselves from the border of existing states).   
 125. See Tweedy, supra note 10, at 655–64.  “[A]s a textual matter the Constitution does 
recognize tribal sovereignty in the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause.”  Id. at 
662–63; see also Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack 
on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 657–58 (2003). 
 126. See Tweedy, supra note 10, at 658.   
 127. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see also Robert J. Miller, 
The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2005).  
 128. Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1401).  
 129. See Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 109, at 55–73 (discussing the “non-
consensual incorporation of Indian tribes into the American polity”). 
 130. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543; see also Miller, supra note 127.   
 131. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832). 
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“treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as 
completely separated from that of the states,”132 even though some Indian 
tribes’ territories were in fact within the geographical limits of some 
states.133  
Things had not changed much by the time Elk v. Wilkins was decided in 
1884.134 In that case, the Court, relying mostly on the “excluding Indians 
not taxed” provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,135 held that the 
Amendment had not granted U.S. citizenship to members of Indian tribes. 
The Court also stated that Indians born within Indian reservations were not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.136 Elk was followed by In re 
Heff, where the Court took the position that one could not be both a United 
States Citizen and an Indian in the constitutional sense.137 The status of 
Indian tribes as political outsiders was re-confirmed in Lonewolf v. 
Hitchcock.138 Drawing an analogy with treaties signed with foreign nations, 
the Court held that the political question doctrine prevented Lonewolf, a 
Kiowa tribal leader, from questioning the validity of a statute unilaterally 
abrogating a treaty made with the Kiowa Tribe.139  
None of the opinions listed above, which treated Indian tribes as truly 
outside the constitutional and political structure of the United States, are 
still the law.  As recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, “State sovereignty does not 
end at a reservation’s border. . . . [I]t was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court 
departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view that “the laws of [a State] can 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id.   
 133. Id. at 560 (“[T]heir territory was separated from that of any state within whose 
chartered limits they may reside, by a boundary line, established by treaties . . . .”). 
 134. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 135. The first sentence of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, 
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  Article 1 also contains an “Indians not taxed” provision.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 136. For a more comprehensive discussion of the case, see POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN 
LANDSCAPE, supra note 108, at 164-68. 
 137. 197 U.S. 488 (1905) (holding that Indians who had been granted U.S. citizenship 
could no longer be considered Indians under the Constitution).  
 138. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
 139. Treaty of Medicine Lodge, Oct. 21, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat 581. The treaty 
specifically provided that it could not be amended without the consent of the Indians 
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have no force” within reservation boundaries.’”140  In re Heff was overruled 
just a few years later in United States v. Celestine.141   
Congress overruled Elk v. Wilkins in 1924, when it enacted legislation 
making all Indians citizens of the United States.142  Furthermore, much of 
the statements made in the case to support its holding are no longer good 
law.  The statement that reservation-born Indians were not “born in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was implicitly 
repudiated just two years later in United States v. Kagama,143 The Kagama  
Court held that Congress had the power to enact legislation subjecting 
Indians committing major crime against other Indians on Indian 
reservations to federal criminal jurisdiction.  Moreover, the statement in Elk 
that “[u]nder the Constitution of the United States, as originally established 
. . . General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed 
as to clearly manifest an intention to include them,”144 was specifically 
disagreed with in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian 
Nation,145 which adopted exactly the opposite position, albeit in dicta, and 
stated that “general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as well as to all 
others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary.”146 As to the 
“Indians not taxed” provisions contained in the Constitution, the tax status 
of Indians began to change shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was 
passed when the Court held in 1870 that the federal government could tax 
tobacco sold inside Indian reservations.147  Following some Supreme Court 
decisions further extending federal taxation in Indian Country,148 the 
Solicitor for the Department of the Interior issued a decision in 1940 
proclaiming that there were no longer any “Indians not taxed” within the 
confines of the United States.149   
In addition, Lonewolf’s reliance on the Political Question Doctrine to 
avoid ruling on the legality of Acts of Congress was expressly overruled in 
                                                                                                                 
 140. 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136, 141 (1980)). 
 141. 215 U.S. 278 (1909). 
 142. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253.  
 143. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 144. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884). 
 145. 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960). 
 146. Id. at 120.  
 147. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).  
 148. See Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v. 
Burnett, 283 U.S. 691 (1931).  
 149. ‘Indians Not Taxed’—Interpretation of Constitutional Provision, 57 Interior Dec. 
195 (1940).  
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Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,150 where the Court analyzed 
whether a statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, and United States v. 
Sioux Nation,151 where the Court reviewed an Act of Congress for taking 
property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.152   
2. Congressional Policies and Statutes 
Over the past few hundred years, Congress has acted to incorporate 
tribes into the United States governmental system. Perhaps the Act starting 
the incorporation process was the 1871 statute that stated, “[N]o Indian 
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with 
whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”153 Even more 
meaningful was the 1924 Act that granted all Indians United States 
citizenship.154 Another key piece of legislation was the 1934 Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) that, aside from putting an end to the Allotment 
policy, authorized tribes to reorganize their governments by adopting tribal 
constitutions which became valid under federal law upon approval by the 
Secretary of the Interior.155 The Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1975 further expanded the policies undergirding the 
IRA.156 Under the Act as originally passed, tribes could enter into contracts 
with the federal government to take over management of programs 
previously administered by federal Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian 
Health Service for the benefit of Indians. That initial Act was substantially 
amended, first in 1988157 and again in 1994, with the enactment of the 
Tribal Self-Governance Act, which allowed tribes to enter into compacts or 
                                                                                                                 
 150. 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977).  
 151. 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980).  
 152. Id.; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 153. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (2012)). 
 154. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as 8 
U.S.C. § 1401 (2012)). 
 155. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012)); see also Singel, supra note 15, at 
808 (“In federalism terms, the Indian reorganization era produced greater standing for tribes 
as functional constituent sovereigns within the United States.”). 
 156. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 
Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e, 458aa-458hh, 458aaa-
458aaa-18 (2012)).  
 157. Indian Self–Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 
2285 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450-450n (2012)). 
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funding agreements with federal agencies.158  This mechanism allowed 
tribes to use federal funds to pay for tribally designed and implemented 
programs pursuant to their own tribal priorities.159 As stated by Professor 
Singel, “The congressional policy of tribal self-determination has bolstered 
the role of tribes as integral participants in the nation’s federal system.”160   
Other congressional legislation incorporating tribes as third sovereigns 
within the federal system includes a series of amendments to many national 
environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act161 and the Clean Water 
Act,162 allowing tribes to be treated as States in order to achieve primacy in 
the implementation of such federal statutes.163 Another recent statute 
continuing this trend is the Dodd-Frank Act,164 which defines “State” as 
including “any federally recognized Tribe.”165  Also important was the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which authorized tribes to enter 
into gaming compacts with the states,166 thus promoting sovereign-to-
sovereign relations between tribes and states. Finally, there are a slew of 
statutes providing that full faith and credit be given by federal and state 
courts to the decisions of tribal courts. Such statutes include the Indian 
Child Welfare Act,167 the Child Support Orders Act,168 the Violence 
Against Women Act,169 the Indian Land Consolidation Act,170 the National 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa-hh 
(2012)).  
 159. On the evolution of the Indian Self Determination Act, see Tadd M. Johnson & 
James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes:  From Paternalism to Empowerment, 
27 CONN. L. REV. 1251 (1995).  
 160. Singel, supra note 15, at 816.  
 161. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107, 104 Stat. 2399, 2464-65 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (2012)). 
 162. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 
1377(e) (2012)).  
 163. See Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300j (2012)).  
 164. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 
31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 165. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(27) (2012). 
 166. Pub. L. No. 100-487, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
2701–2721 (2012)).  
 167. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2012). 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (Supp. I 2013). 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 2207 (2012). 
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Forest Management Act,171 and the American Indian Agricultural 
Management Act.172  
III. The Consequences of Tribal Incorporation  
 This Part analyzes the legal ramifications that should follow from the 
incorporation of tribes into the federal system. After describing the 
implications tribal incorporation should have on legal doctrines used to 
measure tribal sovereignty and congressional power over Indian tribes, this 
article focuses on whether constitutional norms should be applied to tribal 
adjudicative processes.  
A. Applying Constitutional Norms to the Court: Using an Indian Dormant 
Commerce Clause Analysis to Limit Tribal Powers 
The application of the implicit divestiture doctrine by the Court has been 
inconsistent, unprincipled, and confusing.173  To bring order to this 
incoherent doctrine, the best solution would be to turn the clock backward, 
and return to what the law was before the Oliphant decision. In other 
words, it would be best to re-instate the Cohen paradigm.174 However, 
because the Court is not about to do this, a more coherent doctrine to 
control the inherent powers of Indian tribes within our constitutional order 
is to apply an analysis akin to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
Such doctrine would be consistent with Justice Breyer’s re-
conceptualization of the implicit divestiture doctrine in Lara since the Court 
there believed that the lack of tribal jurisdiction found in previous cases was 
based on the policies of the political branches.175 It could also arguably be 
reconciled with the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine as initially conceived in 
Oliphant, which relied partly on the assumptions and policies of the 
Congress.176   
Under traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a state law is 
unconstitutional if it places an undue burden on interstate commerce, even 
though the Congress has not passed any law conflicting with the state 
                                                                                                                 
 171. 25 U.S.C. § 3106 (2012). 
 172. 25 U.S.C. § 3713 (2012).  
 173. See discussion supra Part I. 
 174. See supra note 39. 
 175. See discussion supra notes 26-33.  
 176. See discussion supra notes 37-44.  
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law.177 Under current methodology, if a state law discriminates against out-
of-state interests, the state law is subject to the strictest scrutiny, and is 
upheld only if the law is necessary to achieve an important governmental 
purpose.178 There is a presumption that such discriminatory laws are 
unconstitutional and the Court has almost never upheld any state laws under 
this doctrine.179 If the state law does not discriminate, but nevertheless 
burdens interstate commerce, the Court uses the Pike balancing test. 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits. . . . [T]he extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and whether it could be promoted as well with lesser 
impact on interstate activities.180 
Once a law is found to be non-discriminatory, it is usually upheld.181 The 
last time the Court held laws unconstitutional under the Pike balancing test 
was in the 1980s.182 Although the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has 
come under some sustained scholarly criticism,183 the feeling is not 
                                                                                                                 
 177. For a comprehensive  scholarly treatment of the doctrine, see Donald H. Regan, The 
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
 178. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979). 
 179. There are exceptions.  See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding 
law prohibiting the importation of baitfish into the state in order to protect Maine’s “unique 
and fragile fisheries” from parasites).  
 180. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).   
 181. On application of the Pike balancing test, see David S. Day, Revisiting Pike: The 
Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 27 
HAMLINE L. REV. 45 (2004). 
 182. See Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888 (1988); Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981).   
 183. For scholarly criticism of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Julian N. Eule, 
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Martin H. Reddish 
& Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of 
Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569.  For more recent criticisms, see Brannon P. Denning, 
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008); Sam 
Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 
OKLA. L. REV. 381 (2013). 
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unanimous.184 In addition, some members of the Court such as Justice 
Scalia, have severely criticized the Pike balancing approach.185 Justice 
Thomas stated that he would never overturn any state law that does not 
discriminate against out-of-state interests.186  Nevertheless, the majority of 
the Court still uses the dormant Commerce Clause even if the state law does 
not discriminate.187  As recently stated by the Court,  
Our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence “significantly 
limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise 
burden the flow of interstate commerce.” It is driven by a 
concern about “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-State economic interest by 
burdening out of state competitors.” . . . . 
 . . . The “common thread” among those cases in which the 
Court has found a dormant Commerce Clause violation is that 
“the State interfered with the natural functioning of the interstate 
market either through prohibition or through burdensome 
regulation.”188 
Transposing the elements of the Pike balancing test to a tribal context, 
after first evaluating the “burden” created by tribal regulations on non-
members, one would inquire whether such burdens are clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative benefits to tribal self-government.  The analysis 
would then focus on whether such benefits can be protected by imposing 
fewer burdens on non-members. “Commerce” should be understood to 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The 
Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877 (2011). 
 185. See Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (stating that “the so-called ‘negative’ 
Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial intervention, not to be expanded beyond its 
existing domain”).  For scholarly criticism of the balancing test, see Regan, supra note 177.  
 186. See Hillside Dairy v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“‘[T]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little 
sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application,’ and, consequently, cannot serve 
as a basis for striking down a state statute.”) (citation omitted); see also McBurney v. 
Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1721 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 187. For recent scholarship defending the continued validity of the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine, see Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L. J. 497, 500 (2012) (arguing 
that the overarching unified principle behind all dormant Commerce Clause cases is that 
“[s]tate governments may not take actions that undermine the constitutionally established 
structure of government of which they are a part.”).  
 188. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1719–20 (citations omitted).  
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mean any and all intercourse, relations, and interactions, between the tribes 
and non-members/non-Indians in order to conform to the analysis outlined 
earlier concerning the meaning of “commerce” within the Indian 
Commerce Clause.189 Furthermore, the test should not solely focus on the 
individual interests of non-members to be free of tribal regulations without 
relating them to the interests of the federal government. Thus, the inquiry 
should balance the interests of the tribes in regulating the conduct of non-
members against the burden such regulations impose on the general 
intercourse and relations between the tribes and the United States.  Under 
the test, a tribal regulation would be upheld if it concerned local tribal 
interests and did not unduly infringe on federal interests in governing the 
relations between the tribes and non-members.  In other words, the issue 
would be whether the tribal regulations unduly interfered with overriding 
Federal interests. 
An important caveat here is that this only concerns possible pre-emption 
of direct tribal regulations of non-members.  We are not concerned about 
tribal regulations of tribal members that may indirectly discriminate against 
non-members or put such non-members at a competitive disadvantage.  So 
for instance, unlike a state, a tribe could enact regulations utilizing 
subsidies to promote the commercial competitiveness of tribally owned 
businesses or businesses owned by tribal members.  Only when a tribe 
directly imposes burdens through regulations of non-members that are 
different than or not imposed on tribal members would a “discriminatory” 
issue may arise. Examples of such discriminatory regulations would be 
tribal zoning restrictions imposed only on non-member land use, or a tribal 
tax only imposed on non-member businesses. This difference stems from 
the basic purpose of the Indian Commerce Clause as compared with the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. The Interstate Commerce Clause’s major 
purpose is to ensure the free flow of commerce among or between the 
states, while the purpose of the Indian Commerce Clause is to regulate the 
relations with Indian Nations, including all interactions between Indian 
nations and non-members. Therefore, the voluminous jurisprudence that has 
evolved concerning whether a state law is discriminatory towards out-of-
state interests would have very little, if any, precedential value in 
determining whether a tribal law is discriminatory. 
Would using this approach have made any difference in previous cases 
decided by the Supreme Court?  As previously mentioned, a dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause approach is not unlike the analysis adopted by Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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Rehnquist in Oliphant, since he based his holding on congressional 
assumptions and an overriding federal interest in having United States 
citizens free of unwarranted intrusions into their personal liberty.190  Based 
on his analysis, a Court using a dormant Indian Commerce Clause analysis 
could have easily found that the burden imposed on such federal interests 
was clearly excessive in relation to the putative benefits to tribal self-
government. Concerning tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members, the 
outcome of the path-marking Montana decision would be the same, since 
the tribal law at issue was discriminatory by banning fishing by non-
members while allowing members to continue fishing on portions of the 
Big Horn River.191 As such, it would have had to pass strict scrutiny in 
order to survive. Was the ban necessary to protect a compelling tribal 
interest? Did the tribe use the least restricted means to protect its interests? 
Probably not. 
The next decided case was Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of 
Yakima Indian Nation.192 At issue was the tribal power to zone fee land 
belonging to non-members. In what seemed like a political or Solomonic 
compromise, the Court held that the tribe could zone non-member fee land 
located in the “closed” portion of the reservation where most of the land 
was owned by the tribe, but not in the “open” section where most of the 
land was owned in fee by non-members.  This peculiar result was the 
product of an opinion by Justice Stevens joined only by Justice O’Connor. 
Under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the issue would be first 
whether the tribal zoning regulation was discriminatory against the non-
members. If not, the issue then becomes whether the tribal zoning created 
an undue burden on commerce, trade, intercourse, or relations between the 
tribes and the non-members and whether the tribal law was preempted by 
an overriding federal interest in having such land free of tribally imposed 
regulations. It is hard to see why a simple non-discriminatory zoning 
ordinance would create such an undue burden and be contrary to an 
overriding federal interest.   
The next case to apply the Montana test was Strate v. A-1 Contractors.193  
Except for two earlier cases holding that before a non-member could 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See discussion supra notes 37-44.   
 191. See generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 192. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).  
 193. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Although some may argue that the next case which considered 
the extent a tribe’s regulatory power over non-members under the Montana test was South 
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), the Court in that case only held that the tribe had 
lost its power to regulate pursuant to its treaty power to exclude when the land went out of 
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challenge the jurisdiction of a tribal court in a federal court, that non-
member had to exhaust his or her tribal remedies (i.e. use all the tribal 
appellate procedures available),194 Strate was the first case squarely 
involving a challenge to a tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction195   
In Strate, the Court held that a tribal court did not have jurisdiction to 
hear a tort case involving a traffic accident between two non-Indians on a 
state highway running through the reservation. The state had acquired a 
right of way for the highway from the federal government. The case 
brought two meaningful additions to the law of implicit divestiture. First, it 
held — without citing any authorities or giving any explanation — that, as 
to non-members, “a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its 
legislative jurisdiction.”196 This meant that the Montana test applied to limit 
both the legislative power of the tribal council and the judicial power of the 
tribal court.  Secondly, it substantially narrowed the reach of the self-
government exception to the general Montana rule divesting tribes of 
jurisdiction over non-members. Thus, the Court first stated, “Undoubtedly, 
those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a 
reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of 
tribal members.  But if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the 
exception would severely shrink the rule.”197 After remarking that all the 
cases cited by the Montana Court supporting its second exception “raised 
the question whether a State’s . . . exercise of authority would trench unduly 
on tribal self-government,”198 the Court summarily concluded that 
“[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway 
accident at issue is needed to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them.’”199  
                                                                                                                 
tribal ownership. Id. at 695. The Court did not decide whether the tribe could possibly have 
jurisdiction under either of the two Montana exceptions and left that question to be decided 
on remand.  
 194. Iowa Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Nat’l Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 
471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
 195. The only other two Supreme Court cases that involved challenges to tribal 
adjudicatory powers are Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355 (2001), and Plains Commerce 
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008).   
 196. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.  For an in-depth criticism of this conclusion, see Florey, 
supra note 17, at 1526–32.  “[D]espite the purported clarity of the Court’s holding, the 
source of the rule remained unaccounted for.”  Id. at 1526.   
 197. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457–58.  
 198. Id. at 458.  
 199. Id. at 459 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).  Although the case 
could have been interpreted as limiting tribal court jurisdiction when one non-member tries 
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Under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, courts would not make 
decisions based on the dubious finding that controlling non-Indians who 
drive recklessly or negligently on a highway running through the 
reservation was not necessary to tribal self-government (a rather bizarre 
proposition). Instead, courts would look at whether tribal regulations over 
non-members driving on reservation highways would unduly interfere with 
federal interests, the regulation of commerce, or general intercourse 
between the tribes and the United States.  It is hard to believe such tribal 
regulations would.   
  As explained earlier, Justice Scalia adopted a test balancing tribal 
interest in self-government with the state’s interest in being free of tribal 
regulation in Nevada v. Hicks.200 Under the proposed analysis, instead of 
balancing the tribal interests against the state interests to determine whether 
a tribal court had jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by a tribal member against 
state officers, the court would first ask whether tribal court jurisdiction 
unduly interfered with an overriding federal interest. The answer here is not 
free from doubt, but perhaps Hicks is an unusual and distinct case that 
merits its own mode of analysis.  Thus, because the case involved suing 
state officers in tribal court for something these officers did while 
performing a core governmental function (the investigation of criminal 
activities committed off the reservation), the decision to deny tribal court 
jurisdiction over these state officials could be understood as a case where 
the Court applied a clear statement rule requiring clear congressional intent 
to allow a tribe to burden or interfere with certain aspects of state 
sovereignty.201   
The issue in Atkinson Trading Post v. Shirley202 was whether the Navajo 
Nation could impose a hotel occupancy tax on the non-Indian owner and 
operator of a hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the exterior 
boundaries of the Navajo Indian reservation. The Court held that neither of 
the two Montana exceptions applied, and therefore the tribe could not 
                                                                                                                 
to use the tribal court to sue another non-member, its holding was quickly extended to cover 
all cases involving tribal plaintiffs suing non-members. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998). 
 200. 533 U.S. 353 (2001); see discussion supra notes 72-83.   
 201. See Skibine, Making Sense, supra note 79, at 360–61. The requirement of a clear 
statement before a federal statute interfering with a core state function could be found 
applicable to states was first formulated in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991) 
(finding that Congress did not clearly express the intent to apply the Age Discrimination and 
Employment Act to state judges). 
 202. 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001). 
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impose the tax.203 The Court held that the first Montana exception was 
unavailable because the hotel tax did not have a nexus to the consensual 
relationship the hotel had with the tribe.204  Concerning the second Montana 
exception, the Court stated, “[W]e fail to see how petitioner’s operation of a 
hotel on non-Indian fee land ‘threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the 
tribe.’”205   
One could argue that it is not the operation of the hotel that threatened 
the tribe, but rather the lack of ability to raise governmental revenues from 
non-members through taxation. However, the Court noted that, although 
there was language in one other case referring to taxation as necessary to 
tribal self-government, that case was distinguishable because it did not 
address taxation on non-Indian fee land.206 Furthermore, the Court stated 
that the Montana exception “is only triggered by nonmember conduct that 
threatens the Indian tribe; it does not broadly permit the exercise of civil 
authority wherever it might be considered ‘necessary’ to self-
government.”207 While it is true that the Montana Court phrased the self-
government exception in terms of “conduct” threatening tribal self-
government, none of the four cases listed in Montana to support the second 
exception are limited to conduct. In fact, two of these cases involved 
taxation.208 The two other cases cited - Fisher v. District Court209 and 
Williams v. Lee210 - involved the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts. 
Fisher was a domestic relations case involving child adoption, not conduct. 
Williams likewise did not involve conduct; it involved a non-Indian trying 
to invoke the jurisdiction of state courts to recover a debt owed to him by a 
tribal member. Moreover, since the consensual relations exception allows 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. at 659. 
 204. Id. at 656. 
 205. Id. at 657 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)). 
 206. Id. at 657 n.12 (referring to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)).  
Although the taxation in Merrion was directed at activities occurring on Indian-owned land, 
the Court specifically stated that the tribal power to tax “does not derive solely from the 
Indian tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands.  Instead it derives from the 
tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction . . . 
.”  Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137. 
 207. Shirley, 532 U.S. at 657 n.12 (emphasis omitted).  
 208. Although, strangely enough, the issue in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), and 
Montana Catholic Mission v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118 (1906), concerned the ability 
of the state and not the tribe to tax livestock owned by non-Indians on Indian reservations. 
 209. 424 U.S. 382 (1976). 
 210. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).  
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tribal regulation through “taxation, licensing or other means,”211 the 
wording limiting the second exception to “conduct” may have been 
inadvertent. It is certainly inconsistent with language located earlier in the 
opinion where the Court phrased its overarching principle by declaring that 
the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the 
dependent status of the tribes.”212 The Court never mentioned that only 
regulation of non-member “conduct” may at times be necessary to tribal 
self-government  
Under the proposed analysis, instead of discarding the second Montana 
exception by limiting it to instances involving the “conduct” of non-
members, the Court would first assess whether the tax was discriminatory.  
If it was not, the court would then assess whether such tribal taxation of 
non-members was against an overriding federal interest or would unduly 
burden the flow of commerce or the general trade and intercourse between 
Indians and non-Indians. I do not think it would.  
If the last implicit divestiture case decided by the Court, Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch,213 was limited to prohibiting tribes 
from ordering non-members to sell their lands to certain specified 
individuals, the proposed analysis would probably not impose a different 
outcome. Such tribal action would probably impose an undue burden under 
this version of the Pike balancing test, and would likely infringe on federal 
prerogatives even if Congress had not yet acted. However, allowing tribal 
members to bring actions in tribal court for damages due to discrimination 
is another matter. The tribal interest would be high and the burden on 
federal interests low.   
As mentioned earlier,214 Professor Frickey once remarked that what the 
Court was doing with the implicit divestiture doctrine was similar to a 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.215  However, he was strongly opposed 
to the idea of the Court using such an analysis to restrict tribal inherent 
authority. As he stated, the Court’s “dormant plenary power impulse is a 
striking example of judicial activism against the backdrop of wide-ranging 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
 212. Id. at 564. 
 213. 554 U.S. 316 (2008); see discussion supra notes 84-94. 
 214. See discussion supra note 21.   
 215. See Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 14, at 69–73.  However, Professor Frickey 
warned that “[t]he Court has never even recognized that Oliphant and its progeny share 
some similarities with the dormant Commerce Clause approach, much less attempted to 
legitimate the former by reference to the latter.”  Id. at 68.  
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congressional power.”216 One of the main reasons for his opposition to the 
use of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, however, was that the Court 
has given Congress plenary power over Indian tribes.  Thus, he stated,  
Because congressional power over Indian affairs is plenary, the 
front-line judicial power to invalidate tribal regulation lacks 
clearly defined limits as well.  Moreover, the opinions do not 
aggregate into any presumption favoring the validity of tribal 
regulation of nonmembers so long as such regulation is facially 
neutral and seems free of improper motivation.217  
To this end, in order to neutralize such objection, the proposed analysis 
assigns constitutional boundaries to the power of Congress over Indian 
nations.  
B. Applying Constitutional Norms to Congress: Towards a Limited 
Congressional Power over Indian Nations 
 The Court continues on insisting that “the central function of the Indian 
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in 
the field of Indian affairs.” Yet, most scholars agree that the Commerce 
Clause is insufficient by itself to grant Congress plenary power over the 
internal affairs of Indian tribes.218  As once stated by Professor Clinton, the 
Commerce Clause gave Congress the “power to regulate commerce with the 
tribes, not the commerce of the tribes.”219 In order to determine whether 
Congress has kept its plenary power over Indian tribes, the Court should 
borrow from the jurisprudence relating to the incorporation of federal 
territories into the United States as developed in the Insular Cases.220 The 
Insular Cases held that once a territory has been “incorporated” into the 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id. at 72.   
 217. Id. at 73. 
 218. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside 
Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self–
Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1137 n.150; Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the 
Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK L. REV. 
77 (1993).   
 219. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113, 254 (2002) (emphasis added).  
 220. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic 
of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47 (2004); see also discussion infra notes 289-295.   
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United States, Congress no longer had plenary power in governing such 
territory, but was bound by constitutional limits.221   
Absolute congressional plenary power over Indian nations, including the 
power to abolish tribal sovereignty, is incompatible with the constitutional 
status of Indian tribes once the tribes have been incorporated or integrated 
into our constitutional system as third sovereigns. I am not arguing here that 
Congress never possessed absolute or plenary power to legislate with 
respect to Indian tribes when the tribes were outside the political system of 
the United States. In fact, Justice Marshall himself “implicitly endorsed the 
plenary power of Congress to implement colonization.”222 In Worcester, 
however, Justice Marshall only stated that the Constitution “confers on 
Congress the powers of war and peace, of making treaties, and of regulating 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the 
regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.”223 Today, however, we no 
longer make treaties with the tribes nor can we declare war on the tribes 
since they are internal to the United States. Thus, the Commerce power 
seems to be the only power left.   
It is true that in Lara, Justice Breyer stated that the legislative authority 
of Congress in Indian affairs may rest “not upon affirmative grants of the 
Constitution but upon the Constitution’s adoption of preconstitutional 
powers necessarily inherent in any federal government, namely powers that 
this Court has described as ‘necessarily concomitants of nationality.’”224 
However, after Indian tribes were politically incorporated into the United 
States, the notion that Congress still possesses inherent powers over them 
derived from a pre-constitutional understanding originating from a time 
when Indian nations were considered outside the political system of the 
United States seems untenable and normatively unattractive.225 As argued 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 267-68 (1901). This is not meant to argue that  
Indian tribes have been “incorporated” in the same sense as some of the territories, since 
those territories were incorporated as part of the federal government and not under a third 
sphere of sovereignty 
 222. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 115, at 395. 
 223. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
 224. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).  Justice Breyer perhaps relied on 
earlier arguments made by scholars to the effect that the power of Congress over Indian 
tribes may be “inherent.”  See Cleveland, supra note 16; Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating 
Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 68–69 (1996) [hereinafter Frickey, 
Domesticating]; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 509 (2007).  
 225. See Skibine, Redefining, supra note 11, at 692. 
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by Gregory Ablavsky, a more persuasive argument is that the drafters of the 
Constitution never understood the Commerce Clause as being a large part 
of the total power given to Congress over Indian affairs, let alone the 
exclusive one.226  Instead, federal authority over Indian Affairs was 
presumed to rest on a “holistic interpretation of the Constitution,”227 in 
which the Indian Commerce Clause was “a minor component of a broad 
Indian affairs power resting on multiple [constitutional] provisions.”228 
Although this theory may suggest that United States’ assertion of power 
over Indian nations had pre- or extra-constitutional origins, “it would be 
misleading to characterize the concepts of territorial sovereignty underlying 
claims to authority over Native nations as extra-constitutional.”229 In effect, 
“although concepts of territoriality and the law of nations predated the 
Constitution, the document became the touchstone for their meaning, scope, 
and expression in the post-ratification United States.”230  
Once it is accepted that because of tribal incorporation, Congress no 
longer has plenary power over Indian tribes, the extent of this redefined 
congressional power still has to be determined. There are various ways to 
conceptualize some limits on congressional power over Indian tribes under 
the Commerce Clause. First, one can equate the Indian Commerce power 
with the Interstate Commerce power and impose the same kind of limits.  
Of course, the disagreements that have plagued the interstate commerce 
power would replicate here, with some taking a very narrow view of Indian 
Commerce, such as Justice Thomas recently did in his concurrence in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.231  Others would take a much broader 
view.232 Alternatively, one could take the view that the clause has a 
different meaning when it comes to the power to regulate commerce with 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 
(2015) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause]. 
 227. Id. at 1021.  
 228. Id. at 1050. 
 229. Id. at 1067. 
 230. Id.  
 231. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Robert G. Natelson, 
The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 
811-12 (2006) (arguing that the term “commerce” only had an economic connotation with 
trade at the time the Constitution was drafted); see Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007) (arguing 
that the Clause only gave Congress the power to regulate the mercantile trade between 
people under Federal or State jurisdiction and Indian tribes).   
 232. See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010).  
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the Indian tribes than it has in the Interstate Commerce Clause.233 While 
some have argued that the power is smaller,234 others argue that using either 
an original meaning or an original intent mode of analysis the Indian 
Commerce Clause “should be interpreted broadly to include subject matters 
beyond the narrow meaning (whatever it may be) of ‘commerce.’”235 
According to Professor Fletcher, the reason for giving to the Indian 
Commerce Clause a broader definition than the Interstate Commerce 
Clause is that since the Indian Commerce Clause removed all state power 
from the sphere of Indian Affairs, there are no concerns about the Tenth 
Amendment of federalism limiting Congress’s power in this area.236 
Professor Fletcher concluded, therefore, that the Indian Commerce power 
was, in fact, conceived as extending to every interaction, social or 
commercial, between Indians and non-Indians. While some scholars agree, 
noting that the early Indian Trade and Intercourse Act regulated much more 
than commercial trade between non-Indians and the Indian tribes,237 others 
do not.238   
The power of Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause is extensive, 
but that does not mean it is plenary in the sense of being absolute or 
unlimited. Thus, in later writings, Professor Fletcher drew a distinction 
between congressional power over the tribe’s external affairs, which seems 
to be acknowledged by almost everyone as being plenary, and power over 
the tribes’ internal affairs, which should not be.239   
Even though the constitutional power of the United States over Native 
nations was broad and not solely derived from the Commerce Clause, it was 
nonetheless not considered plenary by the drafters or other federal 
officials.240 Instead, “[a] better reading of history is that the Constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, in THE INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT AT 30: FACING THE FUTURE 28, 31 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher et al. eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause].  
 234. See Steven P. McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st 
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. OF L & SOC. CHANGE 217, 257–63 (1993).  
 235. See Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, supra note 233, at 33. 
 236. See id. at 41. 
 237. See Balkin, supra note 232, at 24.  
 238. See Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A 
Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 60 (2010) (arguing that 
the Trade and Intercourse Acts were mostly enacted pursuant to the Treaty power and not 
the Commerce Power). 
 239. See Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 109, at 75–78.  
 240. See Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 226, at 1053-58. 
“The Supreme Court routinely invokes the Clause to justify plenary power, but this assertion 
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obliquely endorsed a significant and simultaneous shift in Anglo-
Americans’ thoughts about Natives’ status: the repudiation of a theory of 
Native peoples as conquered in favor of a grudging acknowledgment of 
Native independence.”241  Moreover, much of the early understanding and 
practices concerning assertion of United States’ power over Native nations 
relied on the Law of Nations.242  Several scholars have reached similar 
conclusions,243 although one has warned that although “There was 
widespread agreement, then, that the law of nations should governed 
relations between the United States and Natives.  It was less clear what the 
content of that law would be… [t]he fundamentals texts of the eighteenth-
century law of nations, though universalist in aspiration, were Eurocentric 
in content; they said very little about Native peoples.”244 However, 
international norms concerning the rights of Indigenous peoples to self-
determination have evolved. Restricting congressional power from 
interfering with the internal affairs of Indian tribes is more consistent with 
evolving norms of international law.245   
On September 13, 2007, the United Nations adopted its “Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”246 Two of its forty-six articles are 
especially relevant in determining the extent of the right of tribal self-
government. Article 3 states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to 
self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”247 Article 4 ties the right of self-government to the right of 
self-determination and seems to treat it as a sub-part of that greater right. It 
states, “Indigenous people, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
                                                                                                                 
does not find support either in text or in any discussion of tribes’ constitutional status in the 
Clause’s sparse drafting and adoption history.” Id. at 1055.    
 241. Id. at 1058.  
 242. Id. at 1059-61. ”There was little doubt to early Americans that international law 
governed both the United States and Indian nations as well as theor relations.” Id. at 1060.   
 243. See, e.g., Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 224. 
 244. See Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 226, at 1061.  
 245. For an argument that norms of international law should be considered by federal 
courts to limit congressional power over Indian tribes, see Frickey, Domesticating, supra 
note 224. 
 246. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 12, 2007).   
 247. Id. at art. 3.   
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autonomous function.”248  Interestingly, although the Declaration limits the 
right of self-government to “internal and local affairs,” the document does 
not further define the scope of internal and local affairs.  
Defining the extent of the right of tribal self-determination was one of 
the most controversial and confrontational issue in developing the final 
draft.249  Throughout its development, there was no comprehensive 
definition of “self determination” in the Declaration.250  However, “[t]he 
content of the right can to some extent be inferred from many other articles 
in the Declaration that provide decision-making by indigenous people and 
control over their own property and affairs.”251 As explained by Robert T. 
Coulter, under the Declaration, Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-
determination includes: (1) The right to form their own government; (2) 
The right to determine the relationship between that government and the 
greater state; (3) The right to make and enforce laws to govern their own 
affairs; (4) The right to exist, act as a collective body, and participate in the 
international community; (5) The right to engage in political and economic 
relations with others; and (6) The right to control, use, and benefit from 
their lands and resources.252 
Other scholars have taken a much more critical or cautious perspective 
on the Declaration, pointing out that there are many shortcomings in the 
Declaration, notably in the areas of linguistic rights, shared national 
symbols, education, participation in political decisions, immigration and 
citizenship, and redress and reparations.253 Others have argued that as a 
result of the many compromises that had to be made in order for the U.N. to 
adopt the document, the Declaration privileges an individual human right 
paradigm at the expense of a strong form of Indigenous self-
                                                                                                                 
 248. Id. at art. 4. 
 249. See, e.g., Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 
1160-66 (2008) (acknowledging that the right to self-determination is left undefined but 
observing that this was inevitable and perhaps not a bad thing). 
 250. Robert T. Coulter, The Law of Self-Determination and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 13 
(2010).   
 251. Id.   
 252. Id. at 16.  Coulter also emphasized, “This summary is by no means a comprehensive 
enumeration of what is included in the right of self-determination.” Id.  
 253. See Yousef T. Jabareen, Redefining Minority Rights: Success and Shortcomings of 
the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 119, 145–59 (2011). 
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determination.254 For instance, the 1993 draft of the Declaration gave a 
much more extensive definition of the right of self-determination, which 
included indigenous control of “culture, religion, education, information, 
media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, 
land and resources management, environment, and entry by non-
members.”255 Even after the definition was amended by the Human Rights 
Council, many African states remained opposed to the Declaration until it 
was amended by the addition of Article 46(1), which states, “Nothing in 
this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.”256 According to Professor 
Engle, this section was likely included to protect the territorial integrity of 
existing independent states.257 In addition, because sections 2 and 3 of 
article 46 also ensure that the rights guaranteed in the Declaration are 
subrogated to “international human rights”, Professor Engle concluded, 
“The declaration seals the deal: external forms of self-determination are off 
the table for indigenous peoples, and human rights will largely provide the 
model for economic and political justice for indigenous peoples.”258  
One must ask whether it makes more sense to phrase the right of self-
determination in terms of what the indigenous tribe/community can do, or 
in terms of restrictions on what the greater State can do when it comes to 
interfering with the local autonomy of the indigenous tribe/community. 
Some scholars have taken the position that such restrictions are implicit in 
the right to self-determination. For instance, because the general right to 
self-determination declared in article 3 is considerably more extensive than 
the autonomy provided for in article 4,259 Coulter concluded that “the 
general right of self-determination creates a limit on states’ authority to 
restrict by legislation the right of autonomy or any other of the elements of 
                                                                                                                 
 254. See Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2011). 
 255. Id. at 145.  Engle also noted that other language (in former articles 8 and 34) was 
dropped which would have arguably promoted collective over individual rights.  Id. at 149.   
 256. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 246, at art. 46(1).  
 257. See Engle, supra note 254, at 149-50. 
 258. Id. at 147.  
 259. Coulter, supra note 250, at 17.  It should be noted that at least one other scholar has 
taken the position that the right to autonomy in the Declaration is equal if not superior to the 
right of self-determination. Jabareen, supra note 253, at 139 (“The deliberate inclusion of 
autonomy clearly shows that calls for autonomy are not extra, additional, or optional rights, 
but rather fundamental to full and genuine realization of indigenous peoples’ rights.”). 
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the right of self-determination, especially those stated in other articles.”260 
In other words, the Declaration runs against the notion of congressional 
plenary power over Indian tribes existing under United States law. 
C. Applying Constitutional Norms to Tribal Adjudicative Proceedings 
Because the Court in Strate stated that tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction 
could never be larger than a Tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction,261 it has decided 
all the cases challenging the jurisdiction of tribal courts by reference to 
whether the tribal government could regulate the activities of non-members. 
However, if the Court were to adopt a dormant Indian Commerce Clause 
methodology for cases involving challenges to a tribe’s adjudicatory 
jurisdiction I have some concerns that if part of the “burden” on the non-
members was not only regulatory, but also exposure to tribal adjudicatory 
procedures not meeting basic constitutional requirements, tribal courts may 
still end up never having jurisdiction over non-members, even under a 
dormant Indian Commerce Clause analysis.  That is because, in addition to 
deciding whether regulating non-member defendants being sued in tribal 
courts unduly burdened the trade and intercourse between the tribes and 
non-members, cases concerning the extent of a tribal court adjudicative 
jurisdiction would also have to decide whether tribal adjudicative processes 
not affording constitutional due process impose an unacceptable burden on 
non-member defendants.  One could argue, however, that if the federal 
interest here is to make sure that non-tribal members receive a fair trial, the 
application of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) which mandates the 
application of most of the protections of the Bill of Rights to tribal 
proceedings, should assuage those concerns.262 The problem with this 
argument is that federal court review of tribal court decisions can only be 
invoked in cases of habeas corpus.263  Thus, even though the ICRA contains 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Coulter, supra note 250, at 17.  In defining “self-determination,” Coulter relied 
heavily on the work and views of Erica-Irene Daes, who was the chairperson-Rapporteur of 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which was responsible for the drafting of the 
Declarations. See Erica-Irene Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples 
to Self Determination, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1993).  
 261. See discussion supra notes 193-99.  
 262. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 
(2012)).   
 263. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  Moreover, under the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Indian tribes do not have to provide counsel for indigent 
defendants. Id. at 63. Defendants also do not have the right to an indictment by a Grand Jury. 
Id. at 63 n.14.  Furthermore, when it comes to civil instead of criminal proceedings, even 
under the ICRA the right to a trial by jury is not provided. Id. at 63. In addition, the right to 
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a due process clause, federal courts cannot review tribal court decisions in 
civil cases to ascertain whether due process was, in fact, given.  At least one 
commentator argued that because there is a link between the lack of federal 
court review under the ICRA and the Court’s use of the implicit divestiture 
doctrine to deny tribal courts civil jurisdiction over non-member 
defendants, it might be beneficial for tribes to consider endorsing legislative 
proposals extending limited federal court review over some tribal court 
decisions.264 Although that author recommended amending the ICRA to 
provide for limited review of tribal decisions by federal courts,265 another 
legislative possibility would be to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to allow 
removal from tribal to federal court in the same manner that cases filed in 
state court can be removed to federal court.  
The relationship between tribal and federal courts can help  explain the 
interactions between federal and state courts.  Professor Judith Resnick 
once remarked that when issues are important enough to federal courts, they 
will impose federal rules of decisions on either state or tribal courts.266  
According to Professor Resnick, federal courts have allowed Tribes 
unrestricted authority in matters such as tribal membership disputes and 
other intra-tribal issues, such as family relationships, because these “are not 
decisions of national political importance. Hence, ‘letting’ tribes have 
control over these issues is not recognizing them as serious power holders, 
but only as holding power over that which has little import.”267 Because 
federal courts are aware that tribal courts operate according to different 
rules and norms, there is a danger that,  
At some point, from the perspective of the dominant group, the 
“vast gulf” becomes too vast — differences emerge that the 
federal government tries to obliterate.  At such points, the federal 
                                                                                                                 
an independent judiciary is not guaranteed, although many tribal systems do have an 
independent judiciary. See Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the Independence of Native 
American Tribal Courts, HUM. RTS., Winter 2009, at 16 (vol. 36, no. 1); Frank 
Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7, 15 
(1996). 
 264. See Amy Conners, Note, The Scalpel and the Ax: Federal Review of Tribal 
Decisions in the Interest of Tribal Sovereignty, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199 (2012).   
 265. Id. at 246–52.  
 266. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:  Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal 
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989) [hereinafter Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns].  Resnik’s 
thesis, written over ten years before Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), was in fact totally 
predictive of what the United States Supreme Court would do with the Florida Supreme 
Court decision. 
 267. Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 266, at 754. 
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government attempts to remind the dominated group of its 
dependence upon the larger collective and works to bring the 
smaller group into compliance with federal norms.268 
In other words, if tribal courts are going to adjudicate interests important 
to non-members, there is high probability that federal courts are going to 
eventually impose direct federal court review of such decisions to ensure 
that federal norms protecting these interests are enforced. In the next 
section, I consider three possible non-legislative solutions to this quandary. 
1. Dividing Sovereignty 
Under current law, whether the full Bill of Rights is applicable to tribal 
criminal prosecutions depends on whether such prosecutions were 
undertaken pursuant to a reaffirmation of tribal inherent sovereignty or a 
delegation of federal authority to the tribe.  One scholar recently argued 
that, instead of attempting to answer this question, we should acknowledge 
that such prosecutions are undertaken pursuant to both tribal and federal 
sovereign authority and resolve the issue pursuant to a “divided 
sovereignty” approach.269 From an either/or approach (tribal or federal), this 
methodology treats the issue as one of mixed government, at times more 
federal, at others more tribal.  Under  this approach t whether constitutional 
rights should apply to tribal prosecutions of non-members would be decided 
using a  balancing of the interests test similar to the ones used in a “reverse 
Erie” situation (when a court has to decide when federal rather than state 
procedures should be used in adjudicating federal claims in state courts) or 
Matthews v. Eldridge270 (when a court has to decide how much procedural 
due process should be given plaintiffs before their life, liberty, or property 
interests are taken in administrative proceedings).  Here, individual liberty 
interests would be balanced against the tribal interest in “maintaining 
traditional procedures, with a particular emphasis on avoiding systematic 
differences in outcome or the fundamental fairness of proceedings.”271  
Although innovative, there are some potential pitfalls  in  such a test 
when it comes to cases involving the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. First, 
the “Divided Sovereignty” approach would result in ad hoc determinations 
that would foster indeterminacy and uncertainty. Secondly, the approach, 
rather than promoting incorporation of tribes as third sovereigns into the 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. at 756.  
 269. Price, supra note 10.  
 270. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 271. Price, supra note 10, at 711. 
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federal system, might facilitate the incorporation of tribes into the federal 
government itself.  In other words, many courts might decide that most 
tribal actions were federal rather than tribal actions. 
2. Applying the Due Process Clause to the Tribes 
If Indian nations are incorporated into the Constitution, one must ask 
whether this means that some constitutional constraints, such as the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, should be applicable to the 
exercise of tribal governmental power even though this power pre-existed 
the Constitution.272 This argument will face strong criticisms from those 
who argue that Indian Nations never consented to the Constitution,273 or, for 
that matter, to be incorporated into the United States.274 Although I have 
previously rejected such suggestion,275 several reasons now compel me to 
reconsider applying the Fifth Amendment to Indian tribes. First, many 
scholars have expressed strong doubts that the Court would allow tribes to 
prosecute non-Indians and non-member Indians without the full protection 
of the Bill of Rights.276 Second, legislation like VAWA will result in all 
constitutional protections or their equivalent applying to such tribal 
prosecutions.277 Third, applying parts of the Constitution to Indian nations 
may remove some of Justice Kennedy’s quasi-constitutional “consent of the 
governed” argument that American citizens have never consented to be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of a government existing within the United 
                                                                                                                 
 272. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 273. See Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 109.  
 274. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation:  Conquest, Consent, 
and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403 (1994). Some scholars have 
even argued that Indian nations were not, in fact, incorporated into the United States.  See 
Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 37. 
 275. See generally Skibine, Power Play, supra note 65.  
 276. See Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes:  Should Non-Indians Be 
Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. 
GROUPS, July 2012, at 40 (vol. 13, no. 2); Price, supra note 10, at 722 (“Realistically, even 
Lara’s double jeopardy holding appears fragile.”); Trachman, supra note 7, at 886 (“[T]he 
best outcome for retaining tribal sovereignty may be for federal courts simply to construe 
ICRA broadly and find that Congress has already incorporated the constitutional protections 
for defendants.”).  
 277.  The Indian section of VAWA, section 904, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) 
(Supp. I 2013), requires Indian tribes to provide any “rights whose protection is necessary 
under the Constitution of the United States,” and also guarantees defendants “the right to a 
trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that (A) reflect a fair cross section of the 
community; and (B) do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, 
including non-Indians.”  Id. § 1304(d). 
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States but not bound by the Constitution.278  Finally, making the Due 
Process Clause directly applicable to tribal court proceedings would allow 
federal court review of tribal court decisions in civil cases under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, where the federal question is whether the Due Process Clause has 
been violated.279 
In Talton v. Mayes,280 a case decided before most tribal members became 
United States citizens, the Court had to decide whether a citizen of the 
Cherokee Nation was entitled to a grand jury indictment when facing 
prosecution for murder by the Cherokee Nation, which had sentenced him 
to death by hanging.  The Court held that because the Fifth Amendment 
“operates solely on the constitution itself by qualifying the powers of the 
national government which the constitution called into being,”281 it could 
not apply to the local legislation of the Cherokee Nation.282 According to 
the Court, “as the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee 
Nation existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated upon by the 
fifth amendment.”283  
One commentator has argued that Talton should be overruled and the 
Constitution made applicable to Indian tribes because the Tribes lost all 
their inherent sovereignty upon incorporation into the United States.284 The 
argument here, however, is that some constitutional provisions should apply 
to tribal proceedings but for exactly the opposite reason.  It is because 
Indian tribes have retained much of their inherent sovereignty that the 
                                                                                                                 
 278. See discussion supra notes 65-71.  
 279. This would be similar to National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 
U.S. 845 (1985) (holding that a challenge to the jurisdiction of a tribal court was a federal 
question for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because whether a tribal court had jurisdiction 
over non-members was a matter of federal law).   
 280. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 281. Id. at 382. 
 282. Id. at 384-85 (holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution were not applicable to such tribal prosecution because, when prosecuting 
their own members, Indian tribes were not exercising powers delegated by the federal 
government but were acting pursuant to their own inherent sovereign powers).  
 283. Id. at 384.  Interestingly enough, the Talton court could have ruled that the Fifth 
Amendment’s right to a grand jury applied to the Cherokees because Article V of the Treaty 
of 1835, signed between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, provided that the 
United States “shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right by their national councils to 
make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary . . .  provided always 
that they shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the United States.”  Treaty with 
the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 481. 
 284. James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes, 
59 MONT. L. REV. 51, 286 (1998).  
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Constitution should apply to the actions of their governments now that they 
have been incorporated as quasi-sovereign nations into our legal and 
political system.285 This does not suggest that the result reached in Talton v. 
Mayes  should have been different at the time it was made. The argument is 
that the drafters of the original Constitution contemplated the Indian tribes 
to be outside the political system of the United States so, of course, they did 
not make any provision for their eventual incorporation into the 
Constitution.286 Yet, there has been a progressive incorporation of Indian 
tribes into the United States. The Court could remedy that oversight by 
holding that because tribes are sovereign, some of the fundamental liberties 
of the Bill of Rights should be applicable to the actions of tribal 
governments. Properly understood, the argument is that Justice Kennedy, in 
Duro, should not have ruled that Indian tribes have been implicitly divested 
of the power to prosecute non-member Indians. What he should have held 
was that Indian tribes have been divested of the power to prosecute non-
member Indians without affording them the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Applying some constitutional protections to tribal proceedings as 
advocated here is also similar, from a practical and pragmatic standpoint 
(although not from a theoretical one), to a proposal advocated by Professor 
Matthew Fletcher, who argues that tribal courts should presumptively have 
civil jurisdiction over non-members for all activities occurring on Indian 
owned land.287 This presumption could, however, be rebutted in federal or 
state courts if the non-member challenging such tribal jurisdiction can show 
that the tribe did not provide fundamental fairness.   
[A]llowing lower courts to make a collateral evidentiary record 
for the purpose of determining whether the tribe and/or tribal 
court provided adequate due process sufficient to guarantee that 
the exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over the nonmember was 
                                                                                                                 
 285. The argument that Indian tribes lost all their inherent sovereignty upon 
incorporation into the United States is simply not supported by legal precedents, nor can it 
be derived from congressional policies or statutes. See Erik M. Jensen, The Continuing 
Vitality of Tribal Sovereignty Under The Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REV. 3 (1999). 
 286. See Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 109, at 55–60.  
 287. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 779, 785, 828-29 (2014) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Unifying Theory] .  
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fundamentally fair.  This inquiry renders the initial presumption 
[favoring tribal jurisdiction] rebuttable.288 
A similar line of reasoning can be derived from the Insular Cases, which 
decided whether the Constitution should be applicable inside newly 
acquired territories such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, or Alaska.289 The answer  
depended on whether Congress had intended to “incorporate” such 
territories into the United States.290 This intent could be either explicit or 
implicit.291 However, it is interesting to note that even if a territory was not 
held to be incorporated, at least parts of the Constitution were still held to 
be applicable.292 The Court initially made a distinction between 
“fundamental rights,” which were applicable even within unincorporated 
territories, and procedural rights, which were not.293 However, in Dorr v. 
United States, the Court adopted the position that what constitutional 
limitations were applicable inside unincorporated territories “must depend 
upon the relation of the particular territory to the United States.”294   
[T]he imperial era cases have retained vitality, and, when read in 
combination with Reid, have simply modified the analysis of the 
Constitution’s application from whether a particular provision is 
“fundamental” to free government to a case-by-case analysis 
regarding whether the application of the right would be 
“[i]mpractical and anomalous” in any particular country.295 
                                                                                                                 
 288. Id. at 829.  Professor Fletcher’s proposal would, however, only be applicable for 
activities occurring on land owned by the tribe or tribal members.   
 289. The original Insular Cases are a series of twenty-three decisions starting with nine 
cases decided in 1901 and ending with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).  The 
cases delve into the status of territories such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Philippines, and 
Alaska.   
 290. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142-45, 147-48 (1904). 
 291. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 306.   
 292. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (1901). 
 293. Cleveland, supra note 16. 
 294. 192 U.S. 138, 142 (1904).  
 295. Cleveland, supra note 16, at 246. Professor Cleveland quotes Reid v. Covert, where 
the Court had stated, 
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United states acts against 
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.  The United States is 
entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no other 
source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution. 
354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957). 
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This analysis is similar to the one used by the Court in deciding which 
provisions of the Bill of Rights should be applicable to the States through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Initially, none of the 
requirements of the Bill of Rights was thought to be applicable to the states 
after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.296 Yet, by 1897, the Court 
began to selectively incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth 
Amendment through its Due Process Clause.297 Eventually, the Court 
selectively incorporated six of the first eight amendments, the last one being 
the Second Amendment in 2010.298 Although the Court has, at various 
times, used different tests to decide which amendments in the Bill of Rights 
should be incorporated and made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it summarized the law on this issue in Duncan v. 
Louisiana, stating: 
The question has been asked whether a right is among those 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the 
base of all our civil and political institutions,” whether it is 
“basic in our system of jurisprudence,” and whether it is “a 
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.”299 
Deciding that at least the Due Process Clause should be applicable to tribal 
court proceedings as a result of incorporation is not that different from the 
approaches used in the Insular Cases or the selective incorporation 
approach used in applying some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
the States.  
Legally speaking, applying the Due Process Clause to tribes would not 
be that different from other instances where the Court had to stretch or re-
interpret the Constitution because it found the original document to be 
lacking a key provision, the addition of which would make the original 
document more coherent. For instance, there is no Equal Protection Clause 
directly applicable to the federal government - this clause is only found in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.300 Yet, eighty-six years after the adoption of 
                                                                                                                 
 296. See generally The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment very narrowly, including narrow constructions of the Due 
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses contained in the amendment), abrogation 
recognized by Estate of Conner by Conner v. Ambrose, 990 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ind. 1997). 
 297. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 298. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).   
 299. 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968) (citations omitted).  
 300. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”).   
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/2
No. 1] THE INHERENT POWERS OF INDIAN TRIBES 131 
 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment included the requirement not to deny anyone the 
equal protection of the laws.301   
  Applying the Due Process Clause to the tribes is also consistent with 
some noted theories of constitutional interpretation, such as “Framework 
Originalism,” which “views the Constitution as an initial framework for 
governance that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time 
through constitutional construction.”302 According to this theory, the 
drafters did not conceive of the Constitution as a finished product. What the 
drafters did was to furnish a constitutional framework or structure that 
could be built upon by subsequent generations of interpreters in order to 
take care of new and unforeseen challenges and circumstances.303   
Framework originalism permits a great deal of contingency in 
how the Constitution turns out; each of these versions can still be 
faithful to text and principle. . . . [F]ramework originalism does 
not assume that the nature of the Constitution is fully contained 
in its origins in the way that the structure of an oak is contained 
in an acorn.304   
However, “[l]ater generations have a lot to do to build up and implement 
the Constitution, but when they do so they must always remain faithful to 
the basic framework.”305 In our case, Indian nations were supposed to 
disappear or be moved out of the way.306 Fortunately (or unfortunately, 
depending on one’s perspective), things did not turn out that way.307 
Amending the Constitution to clearly define the place of Indian tribes 
                                                                                                                 
 301. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).  
 302. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 549, 550 (2009).  
 303. Id. at 550-51, 553-55. In explaining the meaning of “framework originalism,” 
Balkin juxtaposed it with the theory he termed “skyscraper originalism,” according to which 
the Constitution is “more or less a finished product,” that “views amendment as the only 
method of building the Constitution.”  Id. at 550.   
 304. Id. at 559.  
 305. Id. at 550. 
 306. See Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, supra note 124, at 1051-67 (discussing how the 
Federalists argued that ratification was necessary because a strong central government could 
either vanquish the Indians or removed them from existing states). 
 307. See Kathryn E. Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns: Tribes, Popular Originalism, 
and the Supreme Court, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 297, 308 (2013) (arguing that today’s Court 
clings to the anachronistic “idea that tribes will eventually disappear and its citizens will 
fully assimilate”).  
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within our federalism would be the right thing to do,308 but since this may 
never happen, the Court is left with the role of finding a way to fit Indian 
nations into our constitutional structure.  
There are huge legal hurdles, however, that would have to be overcome 
to make some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to Indian 
tribes. To start with, in Barron v. City of Baltimore,309 a case decided a year 
after Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall held that the Fifth Amendment 
was not applicable to the States.310 While Barron could arguably be 
distinguished since its specific holding was that states are not subject to the 
Fifth Amendment,311 Talton v. Mayes picked up where Baron left off and 
held that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to Indian Tribes.312 It is 
one thing for the Court to stretch the Constitution and make most of the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment;313 it is another to extend application of parts of the 
Bill of Rights to Tribes without the help of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. There is also the problem that, unlike states, Indian 
tribes never consented to be part of the constitutional bargain.314 While 
some Indian tribes, through treaties or adoption of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934,315 may have consented to some form of 
American governance,316 they have still never agreed to be bound by 
constitutional restrictions originally meant to apply only to the federal 
government or the states.317   
In addition to the obstacles created by stare decisis, there are also 
pragmatic problems in applying parts of the Bill of Rights, like the Due 
Process Clause, to tribal court proceedings.  First, some tribal courts may 
not be financially capable of providing constitutional protections, such as 
the right to free legal representation for indigent defendants in criminal 
cases.  Secondly, while some tribal courts have procedures and laws that are 
very similar to American courts, some do not, and the question would be 
                                                                                                                 
 308. See POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE, supra note 108, at 306–09. 
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whether applying constitutional norms would unduly interfere or even 
displace traditional Indian cultural norms.318  In addition, many tribal 
constitutions contain their own due process clause.319 Superimposing a 
federal due process clause may unnecessarily interfere with established 
tribal concepts of due process and fairness. 
Finally, extending constitutional protections to non-members would 
probably also mean extending them to tribal members, thus substantially 
magnifying the interference with existing traditional tribal norms. Thus, 
Justice Brennan dissented in Duro from the majority opinion holding tribes 
were divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians when these 
non-members became citizens in 1924 because these citizens did not 
consent to being subjected to prosecutions by sovereign outside the 
constitutional system.320 Brennan argued that if the majority was right, then 
“the tribes were also implicitly divested of their power to enforce criminal 
laws over their own members who are now citizens as well.”321 Although 
under Justice Kennedy’s argument, the tribes retained jurisdiction over their 
own members because of “the voluntary character of tribal membership and 
the concomitant right of participation in a tribal government,”322 Justice 
Brennan retorted, “the Court’s argument proves too much . . . participation 
in tribal government cannot in and of itself constitute a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.”323 In addition, there would be 
serious equal protection issues in extending all the protections of the 
Constitution to non-members, while not doing the same for tribal 
members.324   
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Because of all of these concerns, perhaps an acceptable solution would 
be to make application of constitutional norms contingent on tribal 
consent.325 In other words, a tribe would acquire full civil adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over non-members upon consenting to be bound by at least the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.326 Tribes choosing to remain 
outside the constitutional framework would be subject to the proposed 
Indian Commerce Clause analysis to determine the extent of tribal court 
jurisdiction over non-members.   
3. Applying Personal Jurisdiction Doctrines 
In a recent article, Professor Katherine Florey attempted to  avoid the 
conundrums and confusion created by the Court’s implicit divestiture 
doctrine when it comes to determining the jurisdiction of tribal courts.327 
After stating that “the absence of doctrinal mooring has given the Supreme 
Court unparalleled freedom to decide cases not according to settled 
doctrinal principles but according to its own ideas and prejudices about 
Indian country,”328 Professor Florey argued that the Court’s normative 
concerns about protecting the right of non-members in tribal courts is not 
served by restricting a tribal court “adjudicatory” jurisdiction by reference 
to whether the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction in this area.329   
Professor Florey further asserted, “[T]here is no good reason why 
existing personal jurisdiction doctrines could not be adapted to encompass 
the issues that tribal court jurisdiction presents . . . . [T]ribal jurisdiction can 
and should be governed by the same jurisdictional doctrines applicable to 
state, federal, and foreign courts.”330 She noted that this is especially useful 
here because it is notions of Due Process that restrict personal jurisdiction 
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in state courts.331 In International Shoe v. Washington, the Court devised a 
test that gave a court jurisdiction as long as the defendant had “certain 
minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”332 In 
a more recent case, Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court,333 the Court 
spelled out a new test under which “even if minimum contacts were 
present, a lack of ‘reasonableness’ could defeat personal jurisdiction.”334 
Even though the Court seemed to have mostly applied the Asahi Metal 
standard in international context,335 Professor Florey argued that this 
standard could be especially appropriate to safeguard the rights of non-
members in a tribal context.336 Although “reasonable concerns about 
fairness, bias, and unfair surprise exist when nonmembers, particularly 
those only marginally connected with the tribe, are haled into tribal courts 
as defendants,”337 “[t]hese, however, are the traditional concerns of personal 
jurisdiction.”338  
Utilizing personal jurisdiction doctrines to determine tribal jurisdiction 
over non-members is normatively attractive and consistent with the idea 
that tribes have been incorporated into the constitutional system. It treats 
tribal courts on par with state courts when it comes to determining 
jurisdiction. Yet, it leaves non-member defendants still a little short of the 
goal line, since they would not be afforded the same protections they would 
have if they were in state courts. Perhaps the better solution for determining 
the jurisdiction of tribal courts would be to adopt the personal jurisdiction 
approach and abandon the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine but also require 
tribal courts to afford defendants some constitutional protections. 
Pragmatically speaking, there is no doubt that the Court will be much more 
inclined to adopt the personal jurisdiction proposal if some constitutional 
norms were applicable in tribal courts.   
Conclusion 
Indian tribes were sovereign nations at the time of the founding of the 
United States, and the Federal government treated them as such by signing 
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treaties that are international documents with most tribes. As sovereign 
entities, however, tribes were considered as being outside the political and 
legal system of the United States, and the Constitution did not guarantee 
them any continuing sovereignty. For the longest time, there was consensus 
that except for tribal external sovereignty, meaning the right to control 
relations with other foreign nations, the tribes’ original sovereignty 
continued unimpaired except to the extent it was explicitly modified by 
Congress or in treaties.339 The consensus broke down starting in 1978 when 
the Court devised its implicit divestiture doctrine. Under this doctrine, the 
Court purportedly determines whether Indian tribes have retained inherent 
civil authority over non-members by reference to whether this 
governmental power is necessary to tribal self-government or whether 
people subject to such power have consented to it. However, what is or is 
not necessary to tribal self-government seems to be determined based on 
subjective notions of whether it is fair to non-members to allow tribal 
jurisdiction over them. Left to pursue its own course based on federal 
common law, it seems that the Court will soon hold that Indian tribes never 
have jurisdiction over non-members unless specifically authorized by 
Congress. Even then, whether the Court will continue to allow Congress to 
reaffirm the exercise of such tribal sovereignty is not a sure thing.   
In order to bring order to this jurisprudential confusion and ensure that 
the original sovereign status of tribes endures, Indian tribes should be 
considered to have been incorporated as third sovereigns within our 
constitutional system. Therefore, the determination of whether tribes have 
certain inherent governmental regulatory powers should be determined 
under constitutional common law, by reference to constitutional norms and 
congressional policies. When it comes to the adjudicative jurisdiction of 
tribal courts, tribal courts should be treated like any other domestic court 
and established principles of personal jurisdiction should determine the 
outcome. However, because - in spite of what it claims - the Court is not 
deciding issues of tribal court jurisdiction over non-members by reference 
to whether it is necessary to tribal self-government, but rather out of 
concerns that the rights of non-members will not be respected in tribal 
courts, applying constitutional norms of due process to tribal court 
proceedings may convince the Court that this approach is worth adopting.   
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